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Abstract  
 
We examine how credit ratings affect capital structure of Norwegian listed firms. The data sample 
comprises 216 companies listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange in the period 2004 to 2010. Three 
concerns for credit rating are investigated. The first identifies which effect access to the public 
market, measured by having a credit rating, have on leverage. Secondly, we examine how being near 
a change in rating level influences decisions regarding leverage. Finally we investigate how firms 
decide upon leverage after a change in rating. The empirical analysis consists of regressions on panel 
data models that explain variation in leverage. We model three tests and include proxies for credit 
rating considerations to capture their influence on capital structure. 
Overall we identify that firms are affected of participating in the bond market and take credit ratings 
into consideration when deciding about capital structure. Participating in the bond market is found to 
provide a 6.94% higher long term debt ratio than other listed firms. Long term debt is increased by 
more tangible assets and reduced with increased size. Furthermore, access to capital is found to be 
most influential for high yield firms, confirming their reliance on the bond market for achieving 
necessary capital. For firms participating in the public debt market we find no evidence that credit 
ratings explain variation in leverage. However, concerns for credit ratings are found to influence 
leverage adjustments. Firms participating in the public debt market are found to reduce long term debt 
when being near a change in rating. Firms issuing new bonds during the period are found to make 
larger reduction in long term debt, as well as they reduce their total debt as well. We conclude that 
Norwegian firms are especially concerned about their credit ratings when making new debt issues.  
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Sammendrag 
 
Denne masteroppgaven undersøker hvilken innvirkning kredittvurderinger har på kapitalstruktur for 
norske børsnoterte selskaper. Analysen er utført på et datasett bestående av 216 noterte, eller tidligere 
noterte, selskaper ved Oslo Børs i perioden 2004 til 2010. Kredittvurderingers innvirkning på gjeld er 
vurdert i tre situasjoner; ved å være i obligasjonsmarkedet og dermed ha en kredittvurdering, ved å 
være nær en endring i kredittvurdering, og ved å få en endring i kredittvurdering. Analysen er utført 
ved å benytte panel data regresjonsmodeller og avdekker hvordan selskapene velger gjeldsgrad eller 
justerer gjeldsgrad i disse situasjonene. Dette er modellert ved tre tester som hver inkluderer proksier 
som reflekterer de ulike situasjonene hvor selskaper tar hensyn til kredittvurderinger.  
Samlet finner vi at selskapene er berørt av å være i obligasjonsmarkedet og at selskapene tar hensyn 
til kredittvurderinger ved valg av kapitalstruktur. Selskapene som har utstedt obligasjonslån er funnet 
å ha en 6.94 % høyere langsiktig gjeldsgrad enn andre børsnoterte selskaper. Langsiktig gjeld for 
disse selskapene øker med andel varige driftsmidler og reduseres med størrelse. Videre er tilgang til 
obligasjonsmarkedet funnet å ha størst innflytelses for high-yield selskaper. Dette bekrefter at disse 
selskapene er avhengig av obligasjonsmarkedet for å oppnå nødvendig kapital. Videre finner vi ingen 
resultater for at selskapene i obligasjonsmarkedet tar hensyn til kredittvurderinger når de velger 
gjeldsgrad. Imidlertid finner vi at hensyn til kredittvurdering påvirker selskapene til å justere 
gjeldsgrad. Selskaper nær en endring i kredittvurdering er funnet å redusere langsiktig gjeld. 
Selskaper som i tillegg utsteder nye obligasjoner i perioden er funnet å redusere langsiktig gjeld 
ytterligere. For disse selskapene finner vi også signifikante resultat for at de reduserer sin total gjeld. 
Vi konkluderer derfor med at norske bedrifter tar særskilt hensyn til kredittvurderinger før de utsteder 
nye obligasjonslån.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Bond issuances have become an increasingly important financial alternative for companies raising 
capital. By the end of 2010 the global bond market was approximately twice the size of the equity 
market. The Norwegian bond market has experienced a similar increase in market capitalization, with 
a growth exceeding 200% during the last decade. However, in the same period there were also great 
losses in this domestic bond market. According to Andreassen (2011) about 60 billion NOK was lost 
in different forms of default, highlighting the severe consequences of companies not being able to 
fulfill their obligations. A thorough assessment of credit risk is hence of great importance for both 
investors as well as issuers. Credit ratings have emerged as important instruments assessing credit risk 
and are applied in most discussions regarding supply of debt. Consequently, an understanding of 
credit ratings and how they influence a firm’s financial performance appear as important for capital 
structure decisions.   
Our main objective is to examine the relationship between credit rating and choice of capital structure 
for Norwegian listed firms. By discussing different capital structure decisions and features of credit 
ratings we identify three credit rating considerations that are examined. Inspired by previous empirical 
findings
1
, different proxies for each consideration are defined. The empirical analysis is constructed as 
a panel data regression evaluating the proxies’ influence on leverage decisions for Norwegian listed 
firms in the period of 2004-2010. 
Our empirical analysis is the first examining the relationship between credit ratings and capital 
structure for listed firms in the Norwegian market, and to our knowledge the only treating credit rating 
considerations so extensively for another market than the U.S.. Unlike similar studies we also 
distinguish between long term debt and total debt to explain leverage decisions in further detail. 
Including credit rating as an influential factor of Norwegian firms’ capital structure has never been 
done before, and is an important contribution that broadens the knowledge of capital structure in the 
Norwegian market.  
The remaining part of the thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter two discusses theories and applied 
variables of capital structure. Chapter three introduces credit rating as an influential factor of capital 
structure and chapter four discuss credit ratings in the Norwegian bond market. The dataset is 
presented in chapter five. Chapter six outlines methodology and evaluation of estimation method 
discussed in chapter seven. Chapter eight presents empirical results. Finally, Chapter nine concludes.    
  
                                                     
1
 See Faulkender, 2006; Mitto and Zhang, 2008; Kisgen, 2006; Kisgen 2009. 
2
 See also Flannery and Rangan (2006) for how industry median leverage can be used as a proxy for capital 
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2 Capital Structure 
   
The basic aim of capital structure is to select a combination of debt, equity and hybrid securities that 
maximizes firm value while minimizing the cost of capital. Efficiency of its capital structure is crucial 
for the ability of a firm to perform well in the market. This chapter starts by outlining theories of 
capital structure and previous empirical findings. In light of these, we define capital structure as a 
concern of leverage and discuss different explanatory variables of capital structure.  
 
2.1 Theories of Capital Structure  
In a perfect capital market, Modiligiani and Miller (1958) argue that the choice of capital structure is 
irrelevant for a firm’s value. However, this does not apply in the real world. By repealing the 
idealized setting in the irrelevance theorem, scholars have identified different conditions affecting 
corporate structure. Such imperfections account for corporate taxes (Modigliani and Miller,1963), 
bankruptcy costs (Stiglitz, 1972; Titman, 1984), agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 
1977), personal taxes (Miller, 1977) and information asymmetries (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 
1984). These relaxations forms the basis for modern thinking on capital structure, where three 
prominent theories are the trade-off theory, pecking order theory and market timing theory. 
The traditional trade-off theory emerged as an adaption of corporate taxes and concern for 
bankruptcy. By balancing the tax savings of debt against the costs of risking financial distress, the 
model targets an optimal debt ratio maximizing the value of the firm (See Modigliani and Miller, 
1973, and Miller, 1977). Additional factors can also be considered in the trade-off framework. E.g. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) arguments for an agency perspective stating that debt can be used to 
disciplines managers and hence mitigate the cost of moral hazard.  
The second recognized theory is the pecking-order theory articulated by Myers (Myers, 1984). The 
theory proposes a prioritized order of funding instead of an optimal ratio of leverage. External funds 
are less desirable because of information asymmetries between internal and external parts. The 
perception is that external funds are undervalued in relation to the degree of asymmetry (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984, Myers, 1984). Consequently retained earnings are preferred over debt, convertible debt 
and equity. 
The market timing theory, uttering that firms attempt to time their raising of capital, has become more 
popular in the recent years. (See e.g. Baker and Wurgler, 2002). The market timing theory is like the 
pecking order theory not suggesting an optimal leverage ratio. The idea is that managers look at 
current conditions in both debt and equity markets and use whichever market currently looks more 
favorable. The theory also argues that managers do not raise capital if either market is not beneficial, 
or contrary they can raise capital at favorable market situations, despite no need for capital.  
 
2.2 Empirical Modeling of Capital Structure   
Capital structure is one of the most studied topics in corporate finance the last decade. Equivalent to 
the many theories proposed to explain capital structure, a vast number of empirical studies have been 
performed to support or disprove these theories. One common approach has been to perform cross-
sectional tests to discover important determinants of capital structure. Proxies for the variables are 
motivated from theories of capital structure, explaining how they will influence a firm’s debt-equity 
choice. Consequently, a number of firm characteristics are found to influence the capital structure 
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choice of companies (See e.g. Titman and Wessels, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1991; Frank and Goyal, 
2009) 
A limitation of such single-period capital structure models is that they disregard firm’s restructuring 
choices over time. Fama and French (2002), among others, have expanded the trade-off theories to 
examine whether companies adjust towards target capital structures and how fast such an adjustment 
is (See e.g. Fama and French, 2002; Flannery and Rangan, 2006). The capital structure choice has also 
been modeled in a continuous-time framework to find how firms engage in a dynamic rebalancing of 
their capital structures. Fisher, Heinkel and Zechner (1989) find an optimal dynamic capital structure 
policy to depend upon the benefit of debt financing, potential costs of debt financing, underlying asset 
variability, the riskless interest rate and the size of the costs of recapitalizing. The presence of such 
adjustment costs is also identified by Leary and Roberts (2005). They find that if the costs outweigh 
the benefits, firms will wait to recapitalize. This coincides with the market timing perception of Baker 
and Wurgler (2002), who argues that firms raise capital if market timing is right.   
Despite of several significant explanatory variables revealed by quantitative analysis, no unifying 
theory has evolved that coincides with the practice of capital structure. In an extensive quantitative 
survey, Graham and Harvey (2001) find that managers are less likely to follow the academically 
proscribed factors and theories when determining capital structure. 81 % of the responses have a 
flexible to somewhat tight debt-equity ratio, but they find moderate support in that firms only target 
debt ratio as their corporate structure policy. Instead, they find informal criteria such as financial 
flexibility and credit rating to be the most important debt policy factors, and earnings per share and 
recent stock price appreciation to be the most important factors influencing equity issuance.  
Henriksen and Stjern (2008) did a similar study for Norwegian listed industry companies and observe 
results in line with Graham and Harvey (2001).  
 
2.3 Capital Structure Decisions  
Motivated by the findings of Graham and Harvey (2001), we restrict capital structure decisions to be a 
regard of firms leverage. Leverage illustrates the importance of non-equity capital for the financing of 
companies. Two types of decisions regarding leverage are modeled; level of leverage and adjustment 
of leverage. This is to reveal how firms decide upon debt ratio and how they actively adjust their 
capital stature with regard to credit ratings.  
The empirical definitions of leverage differ widely. A company typically report long term debt and 
short term liabilities. As the short-term liabilities, e.g. accounts payable, do not claim any explicit 
interest payments they are most likely not a part of a long-term funding strategy (Eidem, Halvorsen 
and Vold, 2010). Rauh and Sufi (2010) highlight the importance of not treating debt as uniform. We 
will hence examine both long term debt and total debt.  
Scholars use either book values or market values of leverage. The use of book leverage can be argued 
as appropriate because debt is better supported by assets in place, rather than growth opportunities 
(Myers, 1977). Moreover, book values are perceived as more reliable to managers deciding on 
financial policy, as the financial markets fluctuate and market values are highly volatile. According to 
Graham and Harvey (2001) a large number of managers confirm that they do not rebalance capital 
structure in response to equity market movements, but focus on book values when deciding on capital 
structure. However, Frank and Goyal (2009) argue that the book values are backward looking and 
measures what have taken place. Hence the book value of equity is primarily used to balance the left-
hand side and the right-hand side of the balance sheet rather than being appropriate for future 
 4 
 
financial targeting. Bowman (1980) demonstrates a large cross-sectional correlation between the book 
and market value. This has provided several studies with justification to assume that using book value 
does not lead to a large misspecification. In addition, we argue for a use of book values since these 
variables are emphasized by the credit rating agencies (S&P, 2002).  
 
2.4 Explanatory Variables of Capital Structure  
A vast number of firm characteristics are found to influence the capital structure choice of companies.  
The lack of one unifying theory of capital structure does however make the empirical findings overlap 
and contradict each other. Frank and Goyal (2009) perform a comprehensive analysis incorporating 
the wide range of factors from the literature. They find a “core model of leverage”, consisting of six 
factors statistically significant across alternative treatments of the data. This model states that industry 
median leverage, tangibility, firm size, and expected inflation increases leverage, while profits and 
market-to-book assets decreases leverage.  In addition they verify that significant factors can change 
over time, e.g. the importance of profits has decreased, whereas firm size and dividend paying status 
have increased.  
Similar studies have been performed outside the U.S. to investigate whether the choice of capital 
structure is based on analogous factors. E.g. Rajan and Zingales (1995) compare public companies in 
G-7 countries and find factors to be correlated in the same way. In the case of Norwegian firms, a 
modest number of empirical studies have been performed.  Available studies by Frydenberg (2004), 
Henriksen and Stjern (2008), and Jensen and Tellefsen (2010) analyze capital structure within one 
specific industry. Mjøs (2007) is the first to perform a comprehensive documentation of capital 
structure in the Norwegian market. He presents a description of the capital structure for Norwegian 
private and public companies for the period 1992-2005. For a subsample of listed companies he finds 
that leverage increase with size, tangibility and industry leverage, and decrease with profitability and 
interest rate levels.  
The previous findings are summarized in Table 1. Mjøs’ results are found to be most relevant for the 
sample of Norwegian listed companies which will be studied in this analysis. Hence, we choose to 
proceed with the explanatory variables size, tangibility, profitability and industry leverage as these 
variables explain several aspects of a firm; scale, profile, performance and industry, and correspond 
with conventional results. Furthermore, Mjøs’ outcome is emphasized as representative for the 
Norwegian listed companies. We will apply these outcomes as hypothesis for how explanatory 
variables affect leverage for these firms. A discussion of each variable follows. 
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Table 1: Previous empirical findings: Identified relationships between leverage and its determinants 
 
Size  
Large firms are often more diversified than smaller firms and less vulnerable to fluctuation. Size may 
therefore be an inverse proxy of bankruptcy risk and have a positive impact on the supply of debt for 
larger firms. In addition, large and mature firms are often better known. Consequently, larger firms 
with better reputation in the debt market may face lower debt-related agency costs. In terms of the 
trade-off theory, larger firms should hence be more leveraged than small firms.  
Size may also be a proxy for the information available for outside investors. Fama and Jensen (1983) 
argue that larger firms would disclose more information to investors and lenders. Reducing 
informational asymmetries would in line with the pecking order increase the investors’ preference for 
equity relative to debt, suggesting a negative relationship between size and leverage. Most scholars do 
however approve the trade-off theory explanation finding a positive correlation between size and 
leverage (see e.g. Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and Zingales, 1995). 
Tangibility  
Tangible assets, such as property, plant, and equipment, are easier for outsiders to value than 
intangibles. The more material possessions a firm has, the more security can be set to potential 
lenders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) address the substitution problem arising when stockholders of 
leveraged firms shift to riskier investments after an issuance of debt. The conflict can be offset if new 
debt is issued with collateral in the assets (Scott, 1977). The use of collateral in tangible reduces the 
cost of financial distress as well as more assets in place should retain more value in liquidation. 
According to the trade-off theory, this has a positive impact on the supply of debt and predicts a 
positive correlation between leverage and tangibility. 
Contrary, when tangible assets are easier to value, increased tangibility would decrease informational 
asymmetries between a firm’s internal and external interests. This will in turn lower cost of equity and 
decrease leverage. The pecking order theory hence predicts a negative relation to leverage. Empirical 
studies show a positive relationship between tangible assets and leverage, valid in both international 
and national studies (See Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Mjøs, 2007).  
 
 
 
Harris and Raviv 
(1991) 
 
Frank and Goyal 
(2008) 
Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) 
Frydenberg 
(2004) 
Mjøs 
(2008) 
Firm size + + + +/- + 
Tangibility + + + + + 
Tax shields +   +  
Growth opportunities + - - +  
Profitability - - - - - 
Volatility -     
Advertising expenditure -     
Uniqueness of product -     
Industry median leverage  +   + 
Expected inflation  +    
Interest rate levels     - 
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Profitability 
A profitable firm has a greater chance of fully exploiting the interest tax shield and face lower 
expected cost of financial distress. The trade-off theory hence predicts a positive correlation between 
leverage and profitability. Higher debt ratios are also consistent with the agency cost of free cash 
flow,  where debt are used as a motivation for managers, employees and other stakeholders to be 
efficient and avoid low-return projects.  
The pecking order theory predicts an opposite perception of free cash flow. Internal funding is 
preferred over external financing, which implies a lower debt ratio for profitable firms. Managers of 
profitable firms may also prefer to avoid the disciplinary role of debt.  Previous empirical studies 
confirm that a negative correlation is the most occurring relationship between profitability and 
leverage. (See e.g. Harris and Raviv, 1991; Frank and Goyal, 2009; Mjøs, 2007) 
Industry leverage  
Various industries experience unlike business environments and are subject to different challenges. 
Some industries are more capital intensive than other, requiring a greater share of fixed assets in order 
to operate. Consequently, such circumstances can cause variation in capital structure, reflecting the 
differential costs and benefits of debt which presumably are related to a firm’s line of business. 
Talberg et al. (2008) confirm a significant difference in capital structure depending on the industry 
where the company operates. High industry leverage should therefore result in higher debt ratios.  
The positive correlation can also be a result of managers using industry leverage ratios as a 
benchmark for target capital structure. Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) find confirming results 
for this by identifying that firms actively adjust their debt ratios towards industry leverage
2
.  
 
                                                     
2
 See also Flannery and Rangan (2006) for how industry median leverage can be used as a proxy for capital 
structure. 
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3 The Significance of Credit Ratings for Capital Structure 
 
The previous chapter discussed conventional explanatory variables of capital structure. This chapter 
introduces credit rating as an influencing factor for leverage decisions. The U.S. credit rating industry 
has grown to become the world leading industry, with Moody’s and S&P as the two dominating 
agencies
3
. Hence, this chapter discusses credit ratings in a U.S. perspective. We first present features 
of credit ratings that underpin why they are important for a company’s debt policy. Thereafter we 
outline previous empirical findings that illuminate this topic.  
 
3.1 Assessing Default Risk 
Credit ratings provide an assessment of a company’s creditworthiness or an individual issue’s credit 
quality. This assessment involves analyzing the firm’s current operational and financial condition, as 
well as the industry and market in which the company operates in. The analysis also takes future 
prospects of these factors into account. Translation of this information into one single letter provides a 
perceived risk of default. The credit ratings common letter designations are presented in  
Table 2. The rating levels from AAA to CCC are modified by adding a plus or minus. This creates a 
relative positioning within each category, where A+ is considered superior to respectively A and A-. 
Bonds rated with an investment grade are associated with good prospects and less risk of default, 
whereas high yield bonds are associated with greater default risk. The critical benchmark between 
investment grade and non-investment grade ratings has therefore an important implication for the 
issuers, as the perception of the two categories labels the issuers into being either a good investment 
or a junk bond.  
 
Table 2: Credit Rating Scale (S&P, Moody’s and Fitch,2011) 
Fitch S&P Moody’s 
Rating grade description of credit risk 
(Moody’s) 
AAA AAA Aaa 
Investment grade 
Minimal 
AA AA Aa Very low 
A A A Low 
BBB BBB Baa Moderate 
BB BB Ba 
Speculative grade, 
High yield 
Substantial 
B B B High 
CCC CCC Caa Very high 
CC CC Ca 
In or near default, with 
possibility of recovery 
C C C 
In or near default, 
without possibility of 
recovery 
                                                     
3 Moody’s Investor Service (Moody’s) and Standard and Poor’s (S&P) are the two leading agencies. Together 
with the minor French rating agency Fitch Ratings (Fitch), these agencies constitute a market share of about 
95%. The remaining 5 % consists of about 150 other local and international credit rating agencies (White, 
2010).    
 8 
 
3.2 Features of Credit Ratings  
The corporate bond market is an important area for bringing issuers and investors together, facilitating 
further operation and development of the company. In such market transactions, credit ratings have 
emerged as an important intermediary. The credit ratings importance has increased in line with the 
importance of assessing creditworthiness. By systematically arranging bonds according to their 
creditworthiness, credit ratings possess features important for the supply of debt.  
Providing of information  
Common practice in the U.S. bond market is that all corporate bonds registered in the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) are credit rated whether requested by the issuer or not (White, 
2002). When a rating is requested the assessment is based on publicly available information as well as 
private information disclosed by the management, and hence the company gets an opportunity to 
provide sensitive information to investors. Thus the difference between them is reflected in what 
information the rating incorporates.  
 
Debt cost of capital  
The yield on bonds and other debt securities are determined by a range of factors. The three most 
discussed risks are interest risk, liquidity risk and default risk, in which default risk is found to 
constitute the largest part of the risk premium (Huang and Huang, 2002; Driessen, 2004; Olsen and 
Steffensen, 2010). Hence this risk is a vital determinant of the total borrowing costs for an issuer. As 
the single mark of a rating provides an external assessment of default risk, ratings are used to compare 
firms across sectors and geographies and decide upon yield spreads according to their individual risk 
level. Ratings do therefore affect the debt cost of capital for a firm.  
The assessment of a company’s creditworthiness often differs between the involved parties, as 
investors and issuers have different access to information. A principal-agent problem can occur when 
the investor cannot completely monitor and evaluate the issuer from an external point of view. 
Knowing that the company has an incentive to ascribe the company better quality to reduce their 
borrowing cost, an investor typically does not rely solely on the information from the company, and 
consequently requires a compensation for risk. Companies use credit ratings to reduce this 
asymmetric information and prevent an additional increase of yield spread and hence reduce total cost 
of debt. 
Rating based regulations  
Credit ratings are also used by regulators to influence market players. This is often referred to as 
‘rating-based regulations’. These regulations originate from SEC’s designation of a few credit rating 
agencies to be a Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO), and ratings from 
such a NRSRO agency approves for a number of regulations. By acquiring a rating from a NRSRO 
agency, firms can achieve benefits such as less disclosure requirements, access to regulated investors, 
as well as access to markets. In addition, these regulations affect regulated investors and by giving 
restrictions on what assets they can hold using certain credit rating levels as criteria.  
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3.3 Previous Empirical Findings 
The majority of previous empirical work is based on studies performed in the U.S. market, where 
credit ratings are found to have a significant role in the financial market. Graham and Harvey (2001) 
found credit ratings to be of the second-highest concern when firms issue debt, outperforming 
traditional factors like tax- or interest concerns. Quantitative studies of credit ratings have identified a 
two-way causality; ratings are affirmed as an influencing factor of leverage, while at the same time 
ratings are predicted as a product of leverage.   
For the effect on leverage, Faulkender (2006) investigate whether having a credit rating or not affect a 
company’s level of leverage. He finds that companies with access to capital, measured by having a 
credit rating, issue 35% more debt relative to companies that do not have this access. A similar study 
was performed on both Canadian and American high- and low quality companies by Mitto and Zhang 
(2010), finding the same positive impact on a firm’s leverage when having access to public debt 
markets. In addition, they find that the impact relative to firms without access is greater for firms of 
low quality. When investigating how different credit rating levels affect leverage, Tang (2009) finds 
that better ratings allow firms to have enhanced capital market access, both in terms of the cost of 
borrowing and the amount of debt issued.  
Furthermore, Kisgen (2006, 2009) expands the literature by identifying how credit ratings affect 
leverage decisions. First, he tests whether companies near a change in credit rating issue less debt in a 
subsequent period relative to companies with a stable rating. He finds significant results showing that 
firms approximately issue 1.0% less debt than equity when being close to a change in rating. 
Additionally, the results are found to be more significant at some rating levels, e.g. like being close to 
the distinction between investment grade and non-investment grade ratings. Second, he investigates 
how changes in credit ratings affect subsequent decisions regarding capital structure. His main results 
reveal that downgraded companies issue approximately 2 % less net debt relative to equity. 
Opposite of these studies, other scholars investigates ratings as a product of leverage.  Ederington 
(1985) states that even though the different variables vary between studies, measures of leverage, 
coverage and/or profitability, firm size and subordination status have consistently appeared to be 
common determinants of credit rating levels.
4
 Based on this, Kisgen (2006) finds leverage to be one of 
three most influencing determinants of credit rating level. Consequently, increased debt is found to 
have a significant negative effect on a company’s credit rating. 
  
                                                     
4
 The statement of Ederington is in accordance to S&P’s specified key criteria for outlining of a credit rating; 
size, profitability and coverage and leverage and capital structure/ leverage and asset protection (S&P, 2001). 
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4 Credit Ratings in the Norwegian Bond Market  
  
The Norwegian bond market has been strictly regulated by the government until 1980. Through the 
following decade, the market became gradually internationalized through deregulation, technological 
development and increased international trade (Weme, 1999). The effect has been entrance of 
additional market players, a more liquid market and increased market capitalization. In spite of this 
development, the market is still small compared to the U.S. bond market, both in market capitalization 
as well as number and sizes of the issues.
5
 Additionally, products are simpler and the market more 
transparent. These market characteristics affect the existence of ratings.  
This chapter presents the use of credit ratings in a Norwegian context and deliberates future prospect 
of the Norwegian bond market. Finally, important credit rating considerations in this market are 
presented and discussed, motivating testable hypothesis for the empirical analysis.  
 
4.1 Use of Credit Ratings  
As the market is small and more transparent, the use of ratings is less widespread. A minor 
importance of the global credit rating agencies is reflected in that only 7 non-financial firms have a 
rating from S&P or Moody’s, referred to as ‘official credit ratings’. Instead, common practice is that 
brokerages produce so-called shadow-ratings for all companies issuing bonds, without charging the 
issuers for it. The ratings are assessed using publicly available information only, but are evaluated 
using the same criteria and rating-scale as the credit rating agencies. Hence, they provide the same 
external assessment of default risk, and are used to compare firms according to their individual risk 
level. These ratings do not provide any sensitive information and do not fulfill the NRSRO rating-
based regulations. However, the use of shadow ratings has been customized to meet the rating-based 
regulations in the Norwegian bond market. E.g. for some of the regulations affecting institutional 
investors, two credit ratings are equivalent to one official credit rating (The Norwegian Registry of 
Securities).  
As each firm making an issuance gets credit assessed, participating in the Norwegian bond market is 
equivalent to receive a shadow rating.
6
 Hence, we focus on these ratings to identify credit rating 
considerations being made in this market. The firms need to relate to the rating as it is used to decide 
upon yield spread.  However, the firms may not consider ratings beyond this since the shadow ratings 
do not reveal any additional value of providing private information or comply with the majority of 
rating-based regulations. This provides the basis for our hypothesis formulated in the following 
section. In the remaining part, in the remaining part of this thesis shadow ratings will be referred to as 
‘credit rating’. 
                                                     
5
 An overview of bond size frequency in the Norwegian market is presented in Appendix A. 
6
 Except for some of the large firms having an official rating, where the brokerages rely on these assessments 
instead of making a corresponding shadow rating.  
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4.2 Testable Hypothesis of Credit Rating Considerations  
Three credit rating considerations will be analyzed to identify the role of credit ratings in the 
Norwegian market. Each one is expected to affect capital structure and we will find how decisions are 
made out of concern of these.  
The first consideration concerns firms participating in the Norwegian bond market and how this 
influences the level of leverage. The analysis will be conducted with two interpretations of credit 
ratings.  The first is the impact on leverage by possessing a credit rating, which implies access to the 
Norwegian bond market. The other distinguishes between levels of rating, primarily investment grade 
and high yield ratings. According to previous findings it is expected that possessing a credit rating 
will have a positive effect on long term debt. In addition, the positive effect is expected to be greater 
for firms of low quality. 
HBMP :  Companies participating in the Norwegian bond market, measured by having a credit 
rating, will have higher debt ratios relative to other listed companies. The effect is 
expected to be higher for high yield companies.  
The other two considerations examine how concern for credit ratings may affect subsequent leverage 
decision. We test for both level of leverage and adjustment of leverage. We do also examine whether 
considerations for credit ratings differ between firms issuing additional bonds versus firms that do not. 
This distinction is motivated by the quantitative findings of Henriksen and Stjern (2008), stating that 
Norwegian industrial companies have a special concern for their credit ratings when making debt 
issues.  
The second consideration examines firms possessing a credit rating close to a downgrade or an 
upgrade and how these firms decide upon leverage. With support in previous findings it is expected 
that these companies will determine leverage to avoid being downgraded or increase the chance of an 
upgrade (Kisgen, 2006) 
HNAC :  Companies being near a change in credit rating level will have lower debt ratios and 
will issue less debt relative to companies not near a change in rating level. The 
negative influence is greater for companies making additional bond issues. 
The third consideration is how an actual change in credit rating level affects subsequent leverage 
decisions. In this analysis we examine if companies that have been downgraded will make a 
subsequent leverage reduction the following year to reverse the downgrade. Supported by the findings 
of Kisgen (2009), we expect that upgraded companies take no subsequent leverage decisions. 
 
HAC :  Companies that have experienced a rating downgrade have lower debt ratios and will 
issue less debt relative to companies that have not experienced a downgrade, the effect 
is greater for companies issuing new bonds. Companies that have been upgraded will 
not take this into considerations when making subsequent leverage decisions.   
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4.3 Future Prospects of the Norwegian Bond Market 
Growing 200% in outstanding bond over the last decade (Andreassen, 2011), the Norwegian market is 
expanding while becoming more similar to the U.S. market. With this development, the trend is 
towards a market more similar to the U.S. market. More advanced and complex products and a less 
transparent market can be an expected outcome.  
 
Figure 1 - Development in the Norwegian bond market, 2000-2010 (Andreassen, 2010) 
 
Given the role of NRSRO ratings in the U.S. market an increased use of official credit rating and 
rating-based regulations might also be expected. There are already two major rating based regulations 
that are being put into force in January 2013; Basel III is the new capital and liquidity rules for banks 
and Solvency II is the new capital requirements for insurance companies, two of the major group of 
investors in the Norwegian market
7
. Hence there is likely to assume that the importance of credit 
ratings and official credit ratings in the Norwegian market will increase.  
 
  
                                                     
7
 See Appendix A for a presentation of investors in the Norwegian bond market.  
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
414 425 475 520 
535 594 
733 775 
934 
1 220 1 287 
Market capitalization - Norwegian bond market  [billion NOK]
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5 Data  
 
Our dataset consists of non-financial firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange and Oslo ABM in the 
period 2004 to 2010. Accounting data on the Norwegian companies were obtained from the 
Brønnøysund Register Centre
8
. Credit ratings were obtained from Norwegian brokerages
9
. This 
chapter describes how the dataset has been obtained and outlines how different samples are 
constructed. The second part presents statistics of each sample.   
 
5.1 Sample Construction 
By the end of 2010, 209 companies were listed on Oslo Stock Exchange and Oslo ABM. By including 
companies that have been listed, delisted, merged or demerged, the dataset encloses 274 companies.
10
  
Financial firms are omitted as they have a more complex capital structure and ratings that are 
compiled on other considerations than non-financial firms.  The data set also excludes companies 
being main-listed on another stock exchange
11
, double-listings and companies that got listed during 
2010. Finally, we eliminate financial years where sum of total assets observed is negative. These 
observations are considered to be outliers and cause biased results. The result is an unbalanced sample 
consisting of 216 companies and 1293 firm-years, by now referred to as the ‘reference’ sample. 
To perform different analysis the reference sample is divided into different sub samples. The ‘rated’ 
sample is compounded by companies that have issued bonds during the years of our analysis period, 
and hence have an accompanying credit rating. Of the 216 listed companies, 59 firms have issued 
bonds in the period. The final rated sample consists of 45 companies and 206 observations. The 
‘unrated’ sample consists of accounting years where the companies do not have a credit assessment. 
The sample includes 1087 firm years, distributed over 200 companies.  
Minor sub samples are presented in Appendix B. 
 
  
                                                     
8
 The Brønnøysund Register Centre is a government body under the Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Industry, 
and consists of several different national computerized registers. 
9
 Norwegian brokerages that have provided credit ratings: DnB Markets, Nordea Markets, SEB Merchant 
Banking and Carnegie. 
10
 Only firms with available accounting data have been included.   
11
 Companies that are listed on another stock exchange might follow other rules or regulations that make them 
outliers in our analysis, and it is considered reasonable to remove them from the reference sample.  
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5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Key characteristics for the reference sample, rated sample and unrated sample are presented in the 
tables below.  
 
Table 3: Key statistics - Reference sample 
 
LTD-
Leverage 
TD-
Leverage 
Size Tangibility Profitability 
Industry-
LTD-
average 
Industry- 
TD- 
average 
# Observations 1293 1293 1293 1293 1293 1293 1293 
Min 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -3.6566 0.0645 0.3592 
25th percentile 0.0405 0.3642 10.92 0.208 -0.0047 0.2380 0.5253 
Median 0.1735 0.5549 12.86 0.0985 0.0591 0.3194 0.5803 
Mean 0.2234 0.5147 11.93 0.2132 0.0165 0.3125 0.5830 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.2071 0.2308 4.0465 0.2565 0.2968 0.0904 0.0698 
75th percentile 0.3528 0.6896 14.33 0.3107 0.1252 0.3910 0.6398 
Max 0.9589 0.9949 20.30 0.9857 0.8974 0.5112 0.7026 
 
 
Table 4: Key statistics - Rated sample 
 
LTD-
Leverage 
TD-
Leverage 
Size Tangibility Profitability 
Industry-
LTD-
average 
Industry- 
TD- 
average 
# Observations 206 206 206 206 206 206 206 
Min 0.0200 0.01292 0.0000 0.0000 -0.6488 0.1711 0.3592 
25th percentile 0.2459 0.5389 12.91 0.1280 0.0193 0.2852 0.5491 
Median 0.3822 0.6378 14.84 0.3059 0.0683 0.3459 0.6168 
Mean 0.3765 0.6137 14.04 0.3813 0.0686 0.3309 0.5917 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.1658 0.1492 3.9688 0.2890 0.1475 0.0665 0.0601 
75th percentile 0.5113 0.7161 16.43 0.6686 0.1323 0.3735 0.6356 
Max 0.8215 0.9429 20.30 0.8988 0.7086 0.4572 0.6949 
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Table 5: Key statistics - Unrated sample 
 
LTD-
Leverage 
TD-
Leverage 
Size Tangibility Profitability 
Industry-
LTD-
average 
Industry- 
TD- 
average 
# 
Observations 
1087 1087 1087 1087 1087 1087 1087 
Min 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -3.6566 0.0542 0.3592 
25th 
percentile 
0.0236 0.3180 10.68 0.0173 -0.0153 0.2337 0.5253 
Median 0.1250 0.5212 12.60 0.0707 0.0579 0.3182 0.5707 
Mean 0.1944 0.4960 11.53 0.1813 0.0066 0.3090 0.5814 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.2013 0.2386 3.9379 0.2370 0.3163 0.0939 0.0714 
75th 
percentile 
0.3117 0.6792 13.97 0.2550 0.1227 0.3910 0.6398 
Max 0.9589 0.9949 18.00 0.9857 0.8974 0.5112 0.7026 
 
The rated sample consists of companies that on average have higher leverage than the unrated sample. 
In addition, the rated sample generally consists of companies that are of greater sizes, have more 
tangible assets and higher profitability relative the companies in the unrated sample. The difference in 
key characteristics can be explained by properties that are typical for companies entering this market. 
One example; companies listed on Oslo Stock Exchange are classified into different sectors that likely 
use bonds to raise capital to different extent. Illustrations of the samples’ sector distributions are 
presented in Figure 2. 
 
Unrated sample: Rated sample: 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Sector distribution of the rated and unrated sample (oslobors.no) 
 
Energi (20 %) Forbruksvarer (15 %)
Forsyning (1 %) Helsevern (8 %)
Industri (16 %) IT (26 %)
Konsumvarer (9 %) Materialer (4 %)
telekom (1%)
Energi (41 %) Forbruksvarer (4 %)
Forsyning (3 %) Helsevern (0 %)
Industri (30 %) IT (5 %)
Konsumvarer (7 %) Materialer (5 %)
telekom (4 %)
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Figure 2 shows that the sector distribution differs between the samples. The most obvious difference 
is the share of the energy and industry sectors, which counts for over 70 % of the observations in the 
rated sample compared to 36 % of the unrated sample. This difference between the samples may help 
explain the difference in key characteristics since different sectors consist of industries of different 
sizes and with operations that requires a large share of tangible assets.  
According to Holba (2006) it has emerged a marketplace for high yield bonds in the Norwegian bond 
market recent years, and this is reflected in the credit rating distribution of the rated sample presented 
in Figure 3.  This indicates that the Norwegian bond market consist of a large share of high yield 
companies.  
 
 
Figure 3: Credit rating distribution of the rated sample 
 
The credit rating levels are divided into two classifications, investment grade and high yield. Credit 
rating observations on investment grade and high yield ratings in our data are presented in  
Table 6. According to Norwegian Trustee
12
 73 % of corporate bonds are high yield rated, hence the 
rated sample provides a good reflection of the Norwegian bond market. 
 
Table 6: Credit rating frequency for investment grade and high yield ratings 
Rating Classification: # observation % 
Investmentgrade 57 27.7 
High yield 149 72.3 
   
  
                                                     
12
 www.trustee.no 
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Rated sample: Credit rating distribution 
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6 Methodology 
 
This chapter presents a generalized empirical model for the analysis of the capital structure decisions 
presented in chapter 2.3 and defines proxies for the explanatory variables. A theoretical discussion of 
estimation models that are relevant for the regressions and how to choose the most appropriate will 
also be presented.  
6.1 General Model  
The dependent and independent variables selected in chapter 2 forms the basis for the general model 
of the capital structure decision:  
Leverage = f (size, tangibility, profitability, industry leverage)  (1) 
 
The two dependent variables are level of leverage (LTD) and adjustment of leverage (ΔLTD). The 
proxy for level of leverage is defined as a companies’ debt over total assets and are the static debt 
ratios for the companies. To measure how firms adjust their leverage the change in debt ratios from 
one year to the next are used as proxy. As discussed in chapter 2.3 the analysis are conducted on both 
long term and total debt for both proxies of leverage.  
Previous empirical literature
13
 is used to decide upon proxies for the explanatory variables. The 
natural logarithm of annual revenues has been a usual measure of the company size. Titman and 
Wessels (1988) argument for a logarithmic transformation of size, so that if a size effect exists, it will 
mainly affect small firms.  Tangible assets over total assets are chosen as a proxy for tangibility as this 
is a frequently used proxy of this variable. Profitability is measured as operating return on assets and 
gives an indication of how efficient companies use their assets to generate earnings. This proxy also 
can easily be used to compare different companies’ profitability. The last explanatory variable, 
industry leverage are measured by estimating the average of leverage; an individual average for both 
long term and total debt for all sectors each year. As a firm’s debt ratio one year is assumed to be 
highly dependent on the debt ratio the previous year, we include last year’s debt ratio in the regression 
on level of leverage to capture some of the more company specific explanation of leverage. Hence, 
more cross-sectional variation in the other explanatory variables is captured. The general model can 
be rewritten:  
 
LTDit/ΔLTDit =  α + β1SIZE it + β2TANGit + β3PROFit + β4IND_ltdit / IND_ tdit  
+ β5LTDi(t-1)/NA + εit      (2) 
 
A summary of the variables are presented in Table 7 along with hypothesis of the explanatory 
variables expected effect on leverage.  
 
 
 
                                                     
13
 See e.g. Titman and Wessels (1988), Frank and Goyal (2009) and Rajan and Zingales (1995). 
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Table 7: Definition, proxies and hypothesis of the variables to the general model 
Variables Proxy Label Hypothesis 
Level of leverage Debt over total assets LTD/TD  
Adjustment of leverage Change in debt over total assets from t-1 to t ΔLTD/ ΔTD  
Size Natural logarithm of revenues SIZE + 
Tangibility Tangible assets over total assets TANG + 
Profitability EBIT + financial income over total assets PROF - 
Industry leverage  Yearly average of each industry’s leverage IND_ltd/IND_td + 
Last year’s level of 
leverage 
Debt over asset in t-1 LTDi(t-1) + 
 
6.2 Estimation Methods  
In light of earlier research, a common approach to analyze a two-dimensional data set is to use panel 
data estimation methods. We will discuss three common estimation methods: pooled ordinary least 
squares model, fixed-effects model and random effect model. 
 
Pooled Ordinary Least Squares Model  
The pooled ordinary least squares model is the most restrictive model of the three, as it assumes no 
individual heterogeneity. The model is estimated by the following equation: 
 
  yit = β0 + βxit + εit       (3) 
where: 
yit: dependent variable 
β0: intercept 
β: vector of the explanatory variables coefficients 
xit: vector of explanatory variables 
εit: error term/residual 
 
The error term, εit, is expected to be independent and identical normally distributed with   N(0, ε
2
). 
The ordinary least squares (OLS)-estimators
14
 are consistent and unbiased if there is no presence of 
heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation in the residual and no correlation between the residual and the 
explanatory variables.  Assumptions for the error term are summarized in Table 8. 
  
                                                     
14
 For derivation of the OLS – estimator see Appendix C. 
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Table 8: Assumptions for the residuals of the pooled ordinary least squares model 
 Technical Notation: Interpretation: Testing for: 
(a1) E[ϵit|xit] = 0 
 
The explanatory variables are strictly 
uncorrelated with the residuals  
 
Independent 
residuals  
 
(a2) 
 
  N(0, ε2). 
 
Normally distributed error term   
 
Normality 
(a3) 
 
E[ϵitϵjs] = σϵ2, i = j, t = s 
 
 
The variance of the error term is constant and 
finite over all values of xit 
 
Homoscedastic 
residuals  
(a4) 
 
E[ϵitϵjs] = 0, i≠ j,t≠ s 
 
There exist no correlation between the residuals  No autocorrelation 
 
Frydenberg (2004) argues that this is the most usual method in the literature and hence is preferred as 
method to make the result comparable with other studies. In addition, this estimation approach is 
simple to perform and requires estimation of few parameters. However, it has some severe limitations. 
First, in the context of capital structure’s vast number of determinants the assumption of no 
correlation between omitted variables and explanatory variables is unrealistic. If assumption (a1) does 
not hold, this model will provide biased and inconsistent estimators. Secondly, when pooling the two-
dimensional data this model fails to explain some of the structure and information available in a panel. 
A wider range of issues can be addressed when combining the time-series and cross-sectional data. 
 
Fixed-effects model 
The fixed-effects model takes the existence of unobserved heterogeneity into account and decomposes 
the residuals into two components; one term that capture the variation between the different firms 
analyzed, categorized as an individual effect term, ηi, and one idiosyncratic error term that capture the 
remaining disturbance, uit. 
 
εit = ηi + uit         (4) 
 
This model controls for the potential correlation between the explanatory and omitted variables by 
treating ηi as a fixed firm effect. The results are constant slopes, but intercept that differ according to 
the cross-sectional firms. In general terms the fixed-effect model takes the form of equation (5): 
 
  yit = (β0 + ηi) + βxit + uit      (5) 
 
Two common estimators for the fixed-effects model are the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) 
estimator and the mean transformed data approach (within estimator). The LSDV estimator requires a 
number of dummy variables that increases with the size of the sample and hence the within estimator 
is more appropriate for analyzing large data samples (Brooks, 2008). Based on the size of our 
reference sample the mean transformation approach is used when applying the fixed-effect model. 
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This method is based on transforming away all the companies’ fixed effects15. By subtracting the 
mean of each the time-varying variables for each company the fixed-effects model become: 
 
  ÿit = βẍit + üit        (6) 
 
The assumptions for the error terms of the fixed-effects model are summarized in Table 9. 
Table 9: Assumptions for the residuals of the fixed-effects model 
 Technical Notation: Interpretation: Testing for: 
(b1) E[ηi | xit] ≠ 0 
 
The explanatory variables are correlated with 
the individual effect term 
 
Individual 
heterogeneity  
(b2) E[uit|xit] = 0 
 
The explanatory variables are strictly 
uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic term 
Independent 
idiosyncratic term 
 
(b3) 
 
  N(0, ε2). 
 
Normally distributed error term   
 
Normality 
(b4) 
 
E[ϵitϵjs] = σϵ2, i = j, t = s 
 
 
The variance of the error terms is constant and 
finite over all values of xit 
 
Homoscedastic 
residuals  
(b5) 
 
E[ϵitϵjs] = 0, i≠ j,t≠ s 
 
There exist no correlation between the residuals  No autocorrelation 
 
 
As the model is independent of the individual effect terms, the fixed-effects model solves the omitted 
variables problem. When assumption (b1) holds the idiosyncratic term can be correlated with the 
individual effects and if assumption (b2) also holds this model provides consistent estimators.  
However, as ηi is treated as a fixed unknown constant for each company the impact of time-invariant 
variables cannot be identified. Thus the fixed-effects model, as the pooled ordinary least squares 
model, will not utilize all available information in the panel data.  
 
Random effects model 
The model presented in equation (5) also applies for the random effect model. The difference is how 
the individual effect term, ηi, is modeled. This model identifies ηi as a random individual disturbance 
effect and enters the regressions randomly every year for each company. The assumptions for this 
model are presented in Table 10. 
  
                                                     
15
 For derivation of the within–estimator see Appendix C. 
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Table 10: Assumptions for the residuals of the random effects model 
 Technical Notation: Interpretation: Testing for: 
(c1) E[ηi | xit] = 0 
 
The explanatory variables are strictly 
uncorrelated with the individual effect term 
 
No individual 
heterogeneity  
(c2) 
 
E[uit|xit] = 0 
 
The explanatory variables are strictly 
uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic term 
Independent 
idiosyncratic term 
 
(c3) 
 
  N(0, ε2). 
 
Normally distributed error term   
 
Normality 
(c4) 
 
E[ϵitϵjs] = σϵ2, i = j, t = s 
 
 
The variance of the error terms is constant and 
finite over all values of xit 
 
Homoscedastic 
residuals  
(c5) 
 
E[ϵitϵjs] = 0, i≠ j,t≠ s 
 
There exist no correlation between the residuals  No autocorrelation 
 
For the random effects model there are two possible estimators, an OLS-estimator and a generalized 
least squares (GLS)-estimator
16
. The difference between the two estimators is that the GLS-estimator 
is efficient with presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the residuals while the OLS-
estimator is inefficient. Hence, choosing appropriate estimator depends on what assumption that 
holds. In contrast to the fixed-effect model, this model exploits all information in the panel data so all 
the effects of the explanatory variables on firm leverage can be illuminated. At the same time, since 
there is less parameters to estimate, the loss of degrees of freedom is lower than for the fixed-effects 
model. Thus the random effect model should produce more efficient estimators, including lower 
volatility in the estimators (Brooks, 2008).  
 
6.3 Selecting Estimation Model 
To select the estimation model that fits the available data best, the properties of the data will be 
explored. First, the models’ underlying assumptions regarding the error terms should be tested for; 
normality, heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and multicollinearity. Then the data are tested for panel 
data effects. If panel effects exist, the ordinary least squares model is excluded since it does not take 
advantage of the structure of the panel data. Hence, either the fixed-effects model or the random 
effects model is preferred. As the assumptions for the pooled ordinary least squares model and the 
random effects model initially are the same; the difference being the decomposed assumptions 
regarding the error term, selecting estimation method are narrowed down to choosing between the 
fixed-effects model and the random effects model. 
The assumption that differs between the models is the assumption regarding correlation between the 
individual error term and the explanatory variables. The random effects model forces this correlation 
to zero and allows no correlation, in contrast to the fixed-effects model that does. The Hausman test
17
 
is a way of determining the plausibility of the fixed-effects versus the random effects model and will 
be performed to distinguish between these models (Brooks, 2008).   
 
                                                     
16
 For derivation of the GLS–estimator see Appendix C. 
17
 The Hausman test is presented in Appendix C. 
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7 Evaluation of Estimation Model  
 
This chapter examines how the data fulfills the assumptions of the discussed estimation models.  Tests 
of each assumption are first performed and discussed. Based on this assessment, the most appropriate 
model is chosen. 
The data exploration and preceding empirical analyses are performed using the statistical software R.  
7.1 Functional Form 
The estimation models assume an existence of linear relationship between the dependent variable and 
the explanatory variables. If a linear model is fitted to variables that do not have a linear relationship 
with the dependent variable, the result can be seriously flawed. However, perfect linearity rarely 
occurs in empirical research. Instead, evidence of nonlinearity should be detected and the variables 
disproved if this occurs. Although no linearity can be identified from the scatterplot in Figure 4, there 
is nothing that suggests a different functional form. The other explanatory variables (see Appendix D) 
also fit the assumption for linearity. Hence it is verified that a linear approximation is proper, although 
there are outliers in some of the linear relationships. 
 
Figure 4: Scatterplot on observations of tangibility and long term debt 
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7.2 Normality  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 depicts the distribution of residuals in the regressions on long term debt and total debt. The 
figure reveals that the residuals are approximately normally distributed, which approves a consistent 
use of the applied statistical F-test and reliability of the estimations.  
 
7.3 Heteroscedasticity  
Heteroscedasticity in the error terms is tested for by using a Breusch-Pagan-test. Results are found in 
Appendix D, indicating heteroscedasticity in both long term debt and total debt regression.  This 
violation of constant variances for the error terms may be due to large variation in the explanatory 
variables. As an example, the revenues of smaller firms can be more volatile than for larger firms.   
The presence of heteroscedasticity can lead to wrong computations of the standard errors in the 
analysis, and hence wrong conclusions about the data analyzed. To deal with heteroscedasticity a 
general method of moments (GMM) estimator can be used while performing a panel data analysis. 
This estimator is usually robust to violations of heteroscedasticity and normality. However, the GMM 
estimators are not always the most efficient estimator (Yaffee, 2003). Another way to deal with the 
heteroscedasticity is to use the GLS estimator for random effects panel data.  
 
7.4 Autocorrelation   
Autocorrelation is detected in the regression of long term debt and total debt using a Breusch-
Godfrey/Wooldridge test, see Appendix D. This could lead to wrong inferences about the relationship 
between the dependent variable and the explanatory variables, and weaken the reliability of the 
model. Autocorrelation are often found due to the inherently dynamic causality of capital structure or 
due to omitted variables. According to Brooks (2008), the GLS estimator handles the presence of 
autocorrelation better than for example the OLS estimator. Another way to deal with autocorrelation 
is to introduce lagged variables in the model. Such a dynamic model can then be modeled by a GMM 
estimator.  
 
 
(a) (b) 
Figure 5: Normality of the residuals for long term debt (a) and total debt (b) regressions 
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7.5 Multicollinearity 
The correlation matrix between the explanatory variables is found in Table 11. The assumption of no 
multicollinearity usually never holds in practice, and a small degree of correlation will not affect the 
results in a significance manner (Brooks, 2008). The correlation between size and tangibility, as well 
as size and profitability, occurs as high, but are not considered to be of such a magnitude that it causes 
loss of reliability of these explanatory variables. However this does not rule out other sources of 
multicollinearity, such as correlation between multiple variables. It is anticipated that this will not 
occur within these variables. Hence, it is concluded to be little multicollinearity in the data. 
 
Table 11: Correlation matrix for explanatory variables 
 SIZE TANG   PROF IND ltd IND td 
SIZE 1.0000     
TANG   0.3218   1.0000        
PROF 0.3038   0.0889     1.0000   
IND ltd 0.047 4  0.2245    0.0410 1.0000  
IND td 0.0532 0.1961     0.0839 0.8023
18
 1.0000 
 
 
7.6 Diagnostics 
The data set are found to fulfill the assumptions of linearity, normality, and no significant 
multicollinearity, while violations of homoscedasticity and no autocorrelation are identified  
Following the discussion in chapter 6.3, we also found significant panel data effects (See appendix E). 
This indicates that a fixed effects model or random effects model should be applied. By conducting 
the Hausmann-test to decide between these two models, no significant correlation between the 
individual specific residual terms and explanatory variables were identified. This applies for both long 
term debt regression and total debt regression. Hence the random effect model is found to be the 
appropriate model.  
The presence of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation favors a use of either GMM- or GLS estimator 
as they control for these violations of the assumptions. The GMM estimator was tried implemented 
for this analysis, but was not computable with the available software because of dummy variables for 
small samples of rating observations. Hence, the GLS-estimator is used in the preceding analysis.  
  
                                                     
18
 The correlation between industry averages of long term debt and total debt are high, as expected. These are 
however not used in the same regressions.  
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8 Analysis 
 
This chapter analyzes the different credit rating considerations discussed in chapter 4.2. Three tests 
are constructed, where proxies of the considerations are applied with the general model. The aim of 
these tests is to evaluate how credit ratings affect leverage for Norwegian listed companies. 
8.1 The Impact of Credit Rating on Capital Structure 
This analysis explores how bond market participation affects firms’ level of leverage and how this is 
influenced by the level of rating. This test will be referred to as “BMP” test.  
Participation in the bond market is modeled as having a credit rating. In accordance to Nguyen and 
Wu (2011) we proxy credit rating by a dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm has a credit 
rating and zero for all other firms. To investigate whether levels of rating affect leverage, two dummy 
variables are included to reflect the categories investment grade and high yield ratings.
19
 By applying 
the proxies to the general model introduced in 6.1, the following two models are regressed: 
 
LTDit / TDit =   α + β1RATINGit + β2SIZEit + β3TANGit + β4PROFit + β5IND_ltdit / IND_ tdit  
+ β6LTDi(t-1) / TDi(t-1) + εit         (7) 
LTDit / TDit  = α + β1 IGit + β2 HYit  + β3SIZEit + β4TANGit + β5PROFit + β6IND_ltdit / IND_ tdit  
+ β7LTDi(t-1) / TDi(t-1) + εit        (8) 
 
The different variables used in the “BMP” test are defined in Table 12, including the credit rating 
considerations hypothesis, HBMP. The results are presented and discussed in chapter 8.1.1.  
Motivated by this test, we regress the general model on the rated sample to identify which explanatory 
variables affect the level of leverage for firms participating in the bond market. This allows for a 
comparison against the hypotheses for the overall of Norwegian listed firms discussed in 2.4. The 
results are presented and discussed in chapter 8.1.2.  
 
 
  
                                                     
19 The two categories are chosen because the distribution of Norwegian firms’ credit ratings does not cover all level of 
ratings. The major part of the observations is in the middle and lower part of the credit rating scale (See descriptive statistics 
in chapter 5.2). 
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Table 12: Variables of the “BMP” test 
Variables Proxy Label Hypothesis 
Level of leverage Debt over total assets LTD/TD  
Size Natural logarithm of revenues SIZE + 
Tangibility Tangible assets over total assets TANG + 
Profitability EBIT + financial income over total assets PROF - 
Industry leverage Yearly average for each industry’s leverage IND_ltd/IND_td + 
Last year’s level of 
leverage 
Debt over asset in t-1 LTDi(t-1) + 
Credit rating 
variables: 
   
Participating in the 
bond market 
Dummy variable (equal to 1) for company i 
having a credit rating in year t 
RATING + 
Investment grade rating Dummy variable (equal to 1) for company i 
having an investment grade rating in year t 
IG + 
High yield rating Dummy variable (equal to 1) for company i 
having a high yield rating in year t 
HY + (+) 
 
8.1.1 Results of BMP test  
According to the results in Table 13, we identify a positive and significant effect of the credit rating 
dummy variable for the long term debt ratio. Firms participating in the bond market have a 6.94% 
higher long term debt ratio relative to the firms that do not. This result confirms that acquiring a bond 
provide access to more capital and hence lead to a higher long term debt ratio for the issuing firm. 
This is in accordance with the findings of Faulkender (2006).  
When distinguishing between levels of ratings in the regressions we identify a positive effect for high 
yield rated firms on both long term- and total debt ratios. Companies with low credit quality have a 
8.90 % higher long term debt ratio and a 3.73 % higher total debt ratio than other listed companies. 
Coinciding with the findings of Mitto and Zhuang (2010), our results confirm how important the bond 
market is for companies with high credit risk, reflected in the recent development in this market. 
For companies having an investment grade rating, the results show an insignificant influence on both 
long term debt ratio and total debt ratio. This states that there is no effect on leverage for these firms 
compared to non-issuing firms. However, the number of observations for investment grade ratings is 
minor compared to number of high yield ratings as mentioned in chapter 5.2. Thus these results may 
be less reliable.  
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Table 13: Bond market participation and effect on level of leverage 
 
Capital structure decision: 
Participating in the Norwegian bond market 
(“BMP” test) 
 Coefficients and p-values from random effects regressions. Regressions of the general model including credit rating 
as measure of market participation and levels of credit rating. The regression is performed on the reference sample 
with long term debt and total debt as dependent variables. 
 
 
Panel A: 
Long term debt ratio 
LTD: 
 
Panel B: 
Total debt ratio 
TD: 
 
 
(7) 
 
(8)  
 
(7) 
 
(8) 
α 
 
-0.0010 
(0.9710) 
 
-0.0089 
(0.7467) 
 
-0.0896 
(0.1344) 
 
-0.0891 
(0.1355) 
RATING 
 
0.0694*** 
(0.0000) 
 
 
0.0206 
0.2579 
 
IG  
 
0.0027 
(0.9222) 
 
 
-0.0456 
(0.1949) 
HY  
 
0.0890*** 
(0.0000) 
 
 
0.0373” 
(0.0585) 
SIZE 
 
0.0022 
(0.1286) 
 
0.0030* 
(0.0422) 
 
0.0189*** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.0195*** 
0.0000) 
 
TANG 
 
0.3078*** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.3032*** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.1984*** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.1948*** 
(0.0000) 
 
PROF 
 
0.0204 
(0.2713) 
 
0.0201 
(0.2769) 
 
-0.0975*** 
(0.0000) 
 
-0.0973*** 
(0.0000) 
 
IND_ltd/IND_td 
 
0.2151** 
(0.0013) 
 
0.2162** 
(0.0012) 
 
0.3743*** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.3639*** 
(0.0001) 
 
LTDt-1/TDt-1 
 
0.2373*** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.2352*** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.2199*** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.2193*** 
(0.0000) 
     
# Observations 1085 1085 1085 1085 
# Years 1-6 1-6 1-6 1-6 
# Companies 208 208 208 208 
R-squared 0.37499 0.38071 0.3011 0.30489 
Adj. R-squared 0.37257 0.37791 0.29916 0.30264 
F-statistic 107.792 94.5809 77.4003 67.4807 
(DF) (6 and 1078) (7 and 1077) (6 and 1078) (7 and 1077) 
p-value 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
P-values are given in parentheses. *** indicates a significance level of 0.1 %. ** indicates a significance level of 1 %. * 
indicates a significance level of 5 % and ” Indicates a significance level of 10 %. 
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8.1.2 Results of explanatory variable regression  
 
Size 
For firms engaged in the public debt market, we find a negative correlation between size and long 
term debt ratio. Although the coefficient is small, the relationship is statistically significant. The 
negative dependence contradicts the hypothesis for the overall of Norwegian listed firms and the trade 
off-theory, for which size can be an inverse proxy of bankruptcy risk. One possible explanation is that 
these firms have a relatively high average long term debt ratio, and a further increase of long term 
debt may be less feasible. As 74 % of the issuing firms are rated as high yield, issuing of more long 
term debt could be costly. The trade-off theory also ascertains that larger firms face lower debt related 
agency-costs. This suggest that the issuing firms could benefit from already being known in the debt 
market, and hence achieve cheaper financing for extra short term debt rather than long term debt. 
Hence, the negative dependence could be explained by firms rather issuing short term debt, as we find 
a significant positive result for the total debt ratio. This corresponds to Frydenberg (2004) stating that 
firms with a low risk of bankruptcy have less short-term debt, while high-risk companies have more 
short-term debt. 
 
Tangibility 
Tangibility is found to have a significant, positive influence on the long term debt ratio for these 
firms. This corresponds with the hypothesis for the overall of Norwegian listed companies, and is in 
line with the trade-off theory and empirical evidence (Harris and Raviv, 1991; Frank and Goyal, 
2009). The results confirm the importance of tangible assets as collateral for the supply of long term 
debt. 
 
Profitability 
The proxy of profitability has a significant and negative correlation with total debt ratio for firms 
engaged in the bond market. This corresponds with the hypothesis for the overall of Norwegian listed 
firms and is supported by the pecking order theory. The theory states that firms prefer internal to 
external financing and hence use excess profit to reduce debt ratio. The coefficient’s magnitude 
therefore explain down payment of debt as important for firms participating in the bond market. As 
these firms are frequently credit assessed, this reflects a concern for the overall debt level to maintain 
a certain rating level.  The lack of significant results for the long term debt ratio may indicate that 
firms rather repay short term debt as this type of debt is easier to adjust.    
 
Industry leverage 
For firms participating in the bond market we find a highly positive and significant correlation 
between total debt ratio and industry average of total debt. This coincides with the findings of earlier 
studies, confirming that firms actively adjust their debt ratios towards industry leverages 
(Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman, 2001). The detection of an insignificant correlation for the long 
term debt ratio is somewhat unexpected.  As credit assessments involves comparisons of the market 
and the industry the firm operates in, it could be expected that average industry leverage for long term 
debt would be a target for comparison. However, the large magnitude of industry median total debt 
indicates that firms rather target this as a maximum of leverage. The results may also be biased due to 
the sector distribution of the rated sample, where the two sectors energy and industry count for over 
70 % of the observations.  
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Table 14: Identifying how firm characteristics explain level of leverage for rated firms 
 
Rated firms: 
How firm characteristics affect level of leverage 
Coefficients and p-values from random effects regressions. Panel A regress the general model of 
explanatory variables on the ‘rated’ sample. The regression is performed with long term debt and 
total debt as dependent variables. 
 
 
Panel A: 
Rated sample 
 
 
LTD 
 
 
TD 
 
α 
 
0.3265*** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.0000 
(0.9997) 
SIZE 
 
-0.0117*** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.0062* 
(0.0488) 
 
TANG 
 
0.2150*** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.0334 
(0.3857) 
 
PROF 
 
0.0626 
(0.3363) 
 
-0.2243*** 
(0.0002) 
 
IND_ltd/IND_td 
 
0.1631 
(0.3371) 
 
0.6107*** 
(0.0002) 
 
LTDt-1/TDt-1 
 
0.2117*** 
(0.0004) 
 
0.2821*** 
(0.0000) 
   
# Observations 189 189 
# Years 1-6 1-6 
# Companies 45 45 
R-squared 0.29974 0.41083 
Adj. R-squared 0.29023 0.39778 
F-statistic 15.6393 25.488 
(DF) (5 and 183) (5 and 183) 
p-value 0.00000 0.00000 
P-values are given in parentheses. *** indicates a significance level of 0.1 %. ** indicates a 
significance level of 1 %. * indicates a significance level of 5 % and ” Indicates a significance level of 
10 %. 
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8.2 Capital Structure Decisions when Being Near a Change in Rating Level 
The proceeding analysis examines whether companies being near a change in rating level adjust their 
leverage to either avoid a downgrade or increase the chance of an upgrade. This test will be referred to 
as the “NAC” test.  
In accordance to Kisgens’ (2006) approach, we define companies near a change in rating level to have 
ratings designated with a plus or minus sign, whereas companies not near a change lies between these 
two levels
20
. Three dummy variables are used as proxies for credit ratings. The first measures being 
near a change in rating and takes the value one if the company has a plus or minus rating the observed 
firm year and zero otherwise. The second dummy variable proxies being close to an upgrade and is 
equal to one if the company has a plus rating and zero otherwise.  In the same way, for measuring 
being near a downgrade, the third dummy variable takes the value one if the company has a minus 
rating and zero otherwise.  
We complement the general model presented in chapter 6.3 with the credit rating variables. 
Regressions of the following two models are performed: 
 
LTDit/ΔLTDit =  α + β1POMt-1+ β2SIZE it + β3TANGit + β4PROFit + β5IND_ltdit   
    + β6LTDi(t.-1)/NA + εit     (9) 
       
LTDit/ΔLTDit = α + βpPLUSt-1 + βmMINUSt-1 + β1SIZE it + β2TANGit + β3PROFit   
    + β4IND_ltdit + β4LTDi(t.-1)/NA + εit    (10) 
 
The different variables used in the “NAC” test are defined and presented in Table 15 including the 
credit rating considerations hypothesis, HNAC. The significant results are presented in Table 16 and  
Table 17. We find no significant results for the regression on level of leverage; see complete results 
from the “NAC” test in Appendix F. 
 
  
                                                     
20
 Rating levels are defines to include the minus, middle and plus specification for a particular rating. E.g. 
Companies having a rating of ‘BB’ refers to ratings of BB-, BB and BB+.  Hence, a change in rating level 
implies an adjustment from BB to B, or BB to BBB. 
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Table 15:  Variables of the “NAC” test. 
Variables Proxy Label Hypothesis 
Level of leverage Debt over total assets LTD/TD  
Adjustment of leverage Change in debt over total assets from t-1 to t ΔLTD/ ΔTD  
Size Natural logarithm of revenues SIZE  
Tangibility Tangible assets over total assets TANG  
Profitability EBIT + financial income over total assets PROF  
Industry leverage Yearly average for each industry’s leverage IND_ltd/IND_td  
Last years level of 
leverage 
Debt over total assets the previous year LTD(t-1) 
 
Credit rating 
variables: 
  
 
Near a change Dummy variable (equal to 1) for company i 
having a plus or minus rating in year t-1 
POM 
- 
Near an upgrade Dummy variable (equal to 1) for company i 
having a plus rating in year t-1 
PLUS 
- 
Near a downgrade Dummy variable (equal to 1) for company i 
having a minus rating in year t-1 
MINUS 
- 
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Table 16: “NAC” test of non-issuing firms and effect on adjustment of leverage. 
 
Capital structure decisions – Non-issuing firms:  
Being near a change in rating  
(“NAC” test) 
 
Coefficients and p-values from random effects regressions. Regressions of the general model including proxies of credit 
rating measuring if the credit ratings are near a change. The regression is performed on the rated sample with 
adjustment in long term debt and total debt as dependent variables. 
 
 
Panel A:  
Long term debt ratio 
ΔLTDit     
Panel B:  
Total debt ratio  
ΔTDit     
 
 
(9) 
 
(10) 
 
(9) 
 
(10) 
 
α 
 
0.0601 
(0.4378) 
 
0.0570 
(0.04647) 
 
-0.1508 
(0.2102) 
 
-0.1629 
(0.1866) 
 
POMt-1 
-0.0602** 
(0.0058) 
 
 
 
 
-0.0039 
(0.8524) 
 
 
PLUSt-1 
 
 
-0.0527* 
(0.0454)  
 
0.0037 
(0.8838) 
MINUSt-1 
 
 
 
-0.0672** 
(0.0092) 
 
 
 
 
-0.0119 
(0.6350) 
SIZEit 
 
-0.0025 
(0.4592) 
-0.0024 
(0.4782) 
 
-0.0007 
(0.8212) 
 
-0.0005 
(0.8659) 
TANGit 
 
0.0333 
(0.4566) 
0.0352 
(0.4347) 
 
0.0546 
(0.1583) 
 
0.0561 
(0.1511) 
 
PROFit 
 
-0.0071 
(0.9293) 
-0.0111 
(0.8910) 
 
-0.1665* 
(0.0301) 
 
-0.1740* 
(0.0248) 
Ind_ltdit/ Ind_tdit 
 
0.0409 
(0.8264) 
0.0452 
(0.8093) 
 
0.2711 
(0.1425) 
 
0.2883 
(0.1268) 
     
# Observations 189 189 189 189 
# Years 1-6 1-6 1-6 1-6 
# Companies 45 45 45 45 
R-squared 0.049614 0.05108 0.04999 0.05239 
Adj. R-squared 0.048039 0.04919 0.04841 0.05045 
F-statistic 1.9097  1.63195 1.92627 1.67705 
(DF) (5 and 183) (6 and 182) (5 and 183) (6 and 182) 
p-value 0.09471 0.14059 0.09197 0.12889 
     
P values are given in parentheses. *** indicates a significance level of 0.1 %, ** indicates a significance level of 1 %, * 
indicates a significance level of 5 % and ” Indicates a significance level of 10 %. 
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Table 17: “NAC” test of issuing firms and  effect on adjustment of leverage. 
 
Capital structure decisions – Issuing firms: 
Being near a change in rating  
 (“NAC” tests) 
 
Coefficients and p-values from random effects regressions. Regressions of the general model including proxies of credit 
rating measuring if the credit ratings are near a change. The regression is performed on the issuing sample with 
adjustment in long term debt and total debt as dependent variables. 
 
 
Panel A:  
Change in long term debt ratio 
ΔLTDit 
 
 
Panel B:  
Change in total debt ratio 
ΔTDit 
 
 (9) (10) (9) (10) 
 
α 
 
0.3260** 
(0.0088) 
 
0.3260** 
(0.0093) 
 
0.1463 
(0.6089) 
 
0.1143 
(0.6895) 
 
POMt-1 
-0.0910** 
(0.0041) 
 
 
 
 
-0.0849* 
(0.0139) 
 
 
PLUSt-1 
 
 
-0.0975* 
(0.0180)  
 
-0.0626 
(0.1597) 
MINUSt-1 
 
 
 
-0.0851* 
(0.0288) 
 
 
 
 
-0.1044* 
(0.0135) 
SIZEit 
 
-0.0024 
(0.6810) 
-0.0024 
(0.6780) 
 
-0.0039 
(0.5117) 
 
-0.0033 
(0.5723) 
TANGit 
 
0.0449 
(0.5382) 
0.0437 
(0.5511) 
 
0.0778 
(0.2816) 
 
0.0785 
(0.2750) 
 
PROFit 
 
-0.1239 
(0.5069) 
-0.1207 
(0.5232) 
 
-0.4407* 
(0.0252) 
 
-0.4536* 
(0.0216) 
Ind_ltdit/ Ind_tdit 
 
-0.5536” 
(0.0658) 
-0.5520” 
(0.6892) 
 
0.0035 
(0.9935) 
 
0.0465 
(0.9132) 
     
# Observations 71 71 71 71 
# Years 1-6 1-6 1-6 1-6 
# Companies 37 37 37 37 
R-squared 0.23947 0.24046 0.20161 0.20968 
Adj. R-squared 0.21923 0.21676 0.18457 0.18901 
F-statistic 4.06162  3.35182  3.28056 2.82798 
(DF) (5 and 65) (6 and 64) (5 and 65) (6 and 64) 
p-value 0.00286** 0.00619** 0.01056* 0.01666* 
     
P values are given in parentheses. *** indicates a significance level of 0.1 %, ** indicates a significance level of 1 %, * 
indicates a significance level of 5 % and ” Indicates a significance level of 10 %. 
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Discussion of results 
In this test we examine whether considerations between being near a change in rating level differ 
between participants of the Norwegian bond market in two settings, firms making additional bond 
issues and firms that do not.  
The results for non-issuing bond market participants are presented in Table 16. We identify a 
significant and negative effect on companies’ adjustment of long term debt.  Companies facing a 
possible change in rating reduce their long term debt 6.02 % in the following year compared to 
companies with stable ratings. Distinguishing between being near an upgrade or downgrade the 
negative effect on long term debt adjustments are respectively 5.27 % and 6.72 %. Furthermore, there 
are no significant results of non-issuing companies adjusting their long term debt due to an unstable 
rating, indicating that these companies make credit rating concerns mainly related to adjustment of 
long term debt.  
The result for issuing companies is outlined in Table 17. We find a negative correlation between being 
near a change in rating and adjustment of long term debt. Issuing companies with unstable ratings 
reduce their long term debt with 9.10 % more than companies with a stable rating the year before a 
bond issue. The negative long term debt adjustment is 9.75% for companies with a possible rating 
upgrade and 8.51% for companies being close to a downgrade.  For issuing firms the result is also 
significant for this credit rating consideration on adjustment of total debt. We estimate that issuing 
companies reduce their total debt by 8.49 % when having concern of a possible rating change. 
Distinguishing between being near an upgrade and downgrade, we have no findings implying that 
issuing companies make adjustment of total leverage being near an upgrade. However, issuing 
companies near a downgrade the year before, reduce their total debt by 10.44 % more than issuing 
firms with stable ratings.   
For firms participating in the public debt market we find no evidence that being near a change in 
rating level influence their level of leverage. However, concerns for credit rating changes are 
identified for leverage adjustment. Firms are found to reduce long term when being near a change in 
rating, independent of making additional bond issues or not. This indicates that the credit rating 
considerations related to being near a change in rating level have a general negative effect on long 
term debt adjustments for companies participating in the Norwegian market. This result confirms our 
hypothesis and implies that companies in the Norwegian bond market adjust their long term debt ratio 
to avoid a downgrade or increase the chance of an upgrade. This result may imply that credit ratings 
influence companies’ long-term funding strategy. Our findings are consistent with the findings of 
Kisgen (2006).   
The negative effect on long term debt adjustment is found to be greater for issuing firms. In addition, 
we find that these firms significantly reduce their total debt as well. This finding indicates that issuing 
companies actively adjust leverage the year before a new debt issue as a consequence of being near a 
change in rating level. These results hence confirm that these firms have additional concern for their 
credit ratings in the sake of their upcoming bond issue. This is in accordance with the findings of 
Henriksen and Stjern (2008), who identify credit ratings as an important factor for leverage decisions.  
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8.3 Capital structure decisions after a change in rating level 
This test examines if a change in company rating has subsequent impact on companies’ capital 
structure decisions. By distinguishing between an upgrade and a downgrade of company ratings we 
will be able to reveal whether there are differences regarding how companies make subsequent 
leverage decisions. This test will be referred to as the “AC” test. 
Credit rating changes are measured by two dummy variables. The first is equal to one if the company 
has been downgraded or zero otherwise. Similar measures the second variable if companies have been 
upgraded when taking the value one. A regression on the following two models test whether 
companies’ level of leverage or leverage adjustment is affected by a company rating change the 
previous year.
21
 
      
LTDit/ΔLTDit = α + β1DOWNt-1 + β2UPt-1 + β1SIZE it + β2TANGit + β3PROFit   
   + β4IND_ltdit + β4LTDi(t.-1)/NA + εit     (11) 
 
The different variables used in the “AC” test are defined and presented in Table 18 including the 
credit rating considerations hypothesis, HAC. The results are presented in Table 19 and Table 20. We 
find no significant results for the regression on level of leverage; see complete results from the “AC” 
test in Appendix G. 
Table 18: Variables of the “AC” test. 
Variables Proxy Label Hypothesis 
Level of leverage Debt over total assets LTD/TD  
Adjustment of leverage Change in debt over total assets from t-1 to t ΔLTD/ ΔTD  
Size Natural logarithm of revenues SIZE  
Tangibility Tangible assets over total assets TANG  
Profitability EBIT + financial income over total assets PROF  
Industry leverage Yearly average for each industry’s leverage IND_ltd/IND_td  
Last year’s level of 
leverage 
Debt over total assets the previous year LTD(t-1) 
 
Credit rating variables:    
After a downgrade Dummy variable (equal to 1) for company i 
being downgraded in year t-1 
DOWN - 
After an upgrade Dummy variable (equal to 1) for company i 
being upgraded in year t-1 
UP NA 
 
  
                                                     
21
 A downgrade may affect behavior beyond this first year. But behavior in upcoming years may be affected by 
subsequent changes in ratings and other changes to the company.  
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Table 19:  “AC” test of non-issuing firms and effect on adjustment of leverage 
Capital Structure Decisions – Non-issuing firms:  
After a Change in Rating  
(“AC” test) 
 
Coefficients and p-values from random effects regressions. Regressions of the general model including proxies of credit 
rating measuring if the credit ratings have either been upgraded or downgraded. The regression is performed on the 
rated sample with adjustment in long term debt and total debt as dependent variables 
 
 
Panel A:  
Change in long term debt ratio 
ΔLTDit 
 
Panel B:  
Change in total debt ratio 
ΔTDit 
 
 
(11) 
 
(11) 
 
α 
 
0.0487 
(0.5302) 
 
-0.1423 
(0.2420) 
 
DOWNt-1 
 
0.0078 
(0.7856) 
 
-0.0200 
(0.4701) 
UPt-1 
 
-0.0578” 
(0.0741) 
 
-0.0376 
(0.2278) 
SIZEit -0.0034 
(0.3104) 
 
-0.0006 
(0.8371) 
 
TANGit 
0.0372 
(0.4093) 
 
0.0594 
(0.1301) 
 
PROFit 
-0.0259 
(0.7488) 
 
-0.1763* 
(0.0217) 
Ind_ltdit/ Ind_tdit 
 
0.0287 
(0.8782) 
0.2635 
(0.1571) 
   
# Observations 189 189 
# Years 1-6 1-6 
# Companies 45 45 
R-squared 0.02811 0.06009 
Adj. R-squared 0.02706 0.05786 
F-statistic 0.87594  1.9391 
(DF) (6 and 182) (6 and 182) 
p-value 0.5137 0.07676 
   
P values are given in parentheses. *** indicates a significance level of 0.1 %, ** indicates a significance level of 1 %, * 
indicates a significance level of 5 % and ” Indicates a significance level of 10 %. 
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Table 20:  “AC” test of issuing firms and effect on adjustment of leverage 
Capital Structure Decisions – Issuing firms:  
After a Change in Rating  
(“AC” test) 
 
Coefficients and p-values from random effects regressions. Regressions of the general model including proxies of credit 
rating measuring if the credit ratings have been upgraded or downgraded. The regression is performed on the issuing 
sample with adjustment in long term debt and total debt as dependent variables. 
 
 
Panel A:  
Change in long term debt ratio 
ΔLTDit 
 
Panel B: 
Change in total debt ratio 
ΔTDit 
 
 
(11) 
 
(11) 
 
α 
 
0.3693** 
(0.0049) 
 
0.2417 
(0.4124) 
 
DOWNt-1 
 
-0.0302 
(0.5366) 
 
-0.0894” 
(0.0949) 
UPt-1 
 
-0.0731 
(0.1664) 
 
-0.0651 
(0.2344) 
SIZEit -0.0040 
(0.5016) 
 
-0.0059 
(0.3242) 
 
TANGit 
0.0811 
(0.2919) 
 
0.1116 
(0.1355) 
 
PROFit 
-0.1915 
(0.3370) 
 
-0.5032* 
(0.0134) 
Ind_ltdit/ Ind_tdit 
 
-0.7368* 
(0.0182) 
-0.1634 
(0.7096) 
   
# Observations 71 71 
# Years 1-6 1-6 
# Companies 37 37 
R-squared 0.16058 0.17041 
Adj. R-squared 0.14475 0.15361 
F-statistic 2.00718  2.18907 
(DF) (6 and 64) (6 and 64) 
p-value 0.07756” 0.05539” 
   
P values are given in parentheses. *** indicates a significance level of 0.1 %, ** indicates a significance level of 1 %, * 
indicates a significance level of 5 % and ” Indicates a significance level of 10 %. 
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Discussion of results  
As in the “NAC” test we examine whether considerations after a change in rating level differ between 
participants in the Norwegian bond market, distinguishing between firms issuing additional bonds and 
the firms that do not. 
The results for non-issuing firms are presented in Table 19. We find that these firms reduce long term 
debt by 5.78 % following an upgrade in rating level compared to companies with stable ratings. Our 
results identify no effect on leverage for companies being downgraded the previous year. Both 
findings contradict our hypothesis, and this result seems peculiar.  
Table 20 presents the results for companies making additional bond issues. These companies are 
found to reduce their total debt the year after a rating downgrade by 8.94 %. Our result identifies no 
effect on leverage after an upgrade.  
We have no findings identifying that change in rating influence level of leverage. The significant 
results find that changes in ratings affect leverage adjustments. The results indicate that issuing firms 
respond to a downgrade by reducing their total debt the following year trying to reverse the rating 
change, since higher rating leads to better borrowing conditions on their upcoming debt issue. Issuing 
companies experiencing an upgrade are already associated with lower credit risk and they are not 
influenced by the rating change in subsequent leverage decisions. The results confirm our hypothesis 
and indicate that issuing companies actively adjust their total debt following a downgrade to increase 
the chance of lower debt cost of capital. These findings are in compliance with the findings of Kisgen 
(2009) in the U.S. market. 
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8.4 Summary of main findings 
Listed companies participating in the Norwegian bond market are found to have a 6.94% higher long 
term ratio than other listed companies. The identified leverage effect is found to be greater for high 
yield companies. Examining what explanatory factors determine capital structure decisions for rated 
companies we find that long term debt ratio is positively influenced by tangibility while increased 
company size reduces it. Total debt ratio is increased by industry leverage and decreased by 
profitability.  
We find no evidence of credit ratings’ influence on level of leverage. However, concerns for credit 
ratings are identified for leverage adjustments. We find that non-issuing companies reduce long term 
debt by 6.02 % as a consequence of being near a change in rating level. Issuing companies are 
identified to make long term and total debt reductions of 9.20 % and 8.49 % the year after they have 
been near a change in credit rating level. In addition they actively reduce they total leverage following 
a rating downgrade with 8.94 % more than other issuing companies.  
These findings indicate that firms in the public market primarily reduce long term debt when being 
near a change in credit rating. This implies that credit ratings influence these firms’ long-term funding 
strategy. Companies that make additional bond issues also make subsequent total debt reductions of 
10.44 % and 8.94 % when they are concerned of being downgraded or experience an actual 
downgrade. This reveals that issuing companies are concerned about their company ratings effect on 
their upcoming bond issues yield spread. Thus they actively adjust total leverage to maintain a certain 
rating level to influence their cost of debt capital. In sum, Norwegian companies are especially 
influenced by their credit ratings in capital structure decisions when making additional debt issues on 
the public market.  
8.5 Weaknesses in the Analysis 
Our findings reveal the role of credit ratings in the Norwegian market. There are however limitations 
and weaknesses affecting different aspects of the analysis.   
Model limitations: 
The three analysis presented in this chapter are all conducted based on the general model. The model 
includes only four explanatory variables and it is likely that there exist omitted variables that 
influence a company’s capital structure. The achieved values for adjusted R-squared vary between the 
different tests, being consistently lower for adjustment of leverage as dependent variable. In some 
analyzes the model only explains 2-5 % of the variation in leverage adjustments. The adjusted R-
squares from traditional leverage regressions range from 18% to 29% (Lemmon, Roberts and Zender, 
2008). Hence it could be desirable to include additional determinants of capital structure to make the 
model more refined and to increase accuracy. 
 
Sample limitations:  
The rated sample is small compared to the reference sample, accounting for less than 15 percent. A 
small sample size does often affect the reliability of the results because it leads to higher variability.   
The sample size is also affected by uncover age bias, as it was difficult to obtain credit ratings from 
Norwegian brokerages. The sample does not reflect all bond issuing firms, as the majority of 
brokerages do not track historical ratings.  
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In addition, we have made some controversial assumptions when constructing the rated sample with 
the available ratings. When we only were provided with a companies’ bond rating we substituted 
these to be valid as a company rating. If we had discontinuous credit ratings we assumed a linear 
relationship between the outer years and estimated credit ratings for the years in between. Seen in 
context with lack of credit ratings from additional brokerages some observations may create a bias in 
our results when the company are analyzed as unrated when it actually have a credit rating, and vice 
versa. This might be one of the most important limitations of our study.  
The rated sample has ratings that are unevenly distributed across the credit rating scale, and most of 
the observations are on the middle of the scale.  
Analysis-construction limitations  
In the “NAC” test, we define credit ratings near a change to be designated with a plus or minus sign. 
This may be an inappropriate approximation of ‘rating being near a change’ since a company that 
such a rating may not be closer to a change in rating than a company that has a rating without a plus 
or minus. In addition, there is possible that companies will have concern of rating changes moving 
from a BB to either a BB+ or BB-, since it is possible to be close to a rating change for all 27 levels of 
rating
22
. This was taken into consideration but due to the distribution of the credit ratings and the few 
observations on each rating in total we preceded the analysis with nine levels of credit ratings. With a 
larger rated sample in would have been interesting to define ‘ratings close to a change’ in a more 
accurate way. 
 
Market and economic limitations: 
It is likely that additional factors may have influenced the observed capital structures decisions in our 
study. The Norwegian financial market has experienced severe market fluctuations during the 
analyzed period, as well as the bond market has experienced extensive growth. Among other, these 
factors may also have affected the firms’ debt ratio.   
 
 
  
                                                     
22
 Ksigen (2006) uses two different proxies being near a change in credit rating level. One is based on nine 
rating levels while the other is based on 27.  
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9 Conclusion  
 
Using panel data analysis we have examined the role of credit ratings in the Norwegian market, and 
identified how leverage decisions are made out of concern of these. Norwegian listed companies are 
found to be influenced by credit ratings when making decisions regarding leverage based on three 
tested considerations. The first confirms that participation in the bond market leads to a 6.94% higher 
long term debt ratio, as a result of access to capital. A greater effect for high yield companies is also 
identified. Secondly, firms in the public market reduce long term debt 6.02 % more when being near a 
change in rating level the previous year. This negative effect on long term leverage is identified to be 
greater for companies making additional bond issues. Finally, firms in the public debt market that 
make new bond issues during the analysis period are identified to reduce their total debt with 10.44 % 
and 8.94 % as a result of either a concern of being downgraded or experiencing a downgrade. Our 
findings reveal that credit rating considerations for firms in the public market have impact on leverage 
adjustments. We found no significant result suggesting credit ratings influence the level of leverage.  
There are limitations in the empirical model and the data. The results are affected by few 
observations, unequal distribution of credit rating levels and limited access to historical credit ratings 
for Norwegian companies, which limits the data set used in the analysis. Nevertheless, the limitations 
in the data are a result of characteristics in the Norwegian market.  
The empirical model is applied for all analyses and the explanatory degree is low in some the 
achieved results. This makes it difficult to draw any general conclusions. A model explaining more of 
the variation in capital structure might have provided more accurate results. Further, analyzing other 
proxies for credit ratings would have been interesting. This is especially with regards to the 
definitions of a credit rating near a change in rating level. Assuming that the Norwegian bond market 
continues to develop, it would be interesting to do a similar examination in this market in a few years 
to follow the evolution of credit ratings in this market.   
This paper represents the foundations of empirical literature combining credit rating and capital 
structure in the Norwegian market. Hence this is a contribution to the knowledge of capital structure 
in this market. In addition, this is the first empirical study analyzing the importance of credit ratings to 
such an extent for another market than the U.S. We identify credit rating effects on long term debt and 
that these may influence companies as part of a long-term funding strategy. In addition, maintaining a 
certain credit rating level are of importance for companies making bond issues as higher credit rating 
levels are associated with better costs on debt capital. Overall, we conclude that Norwegian firms 
have especially concern for their credit ratings when making debt issues. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Market Characteristics of the Norwegian Bond Market 
A.1. Bond Issues – Oslo Stock Exchange 
Approximately 75% of all Norwegian bonds are listed and is an indication of the total Norwegian 
bond market regarding size of issuance and number of loans.  These characteristics are illustrated in 
Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: Overview of bond issues listed on Oslo Stock Exchange per 05.12.2011 
A.2.  Investors in the Norwegian market 
The major groups of investors in the Norwegian bond market are foreign investors, insurance 
companies, social security administration and banks. Figure 7 shows the investors of the bonds in the 
Norwegian market by sector.   
 
 
Figure 7: Investors in the Norwegian bond market, by sector and market (ssb, 2010) 
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Appendix B: Construction of subsamples 
Rated sample 
The rated sample is based on companies that have issued bonds
23
 during the years of our analysis 
period, due to the practice of Norwegian brokerage to produce a credit assessment (shadow rating) of 
bond issuers. Of the 216 listed companies, 59 have issued bonds during the seven years of our 
analysis period. It has been difficult to obtain shadow ratings from brokerages and only four have had 
historical shadow ratings we can use in our analysis; DnB Markets, Nordea Markets, SEB Merchant 
Banking and Carnegie.  
If both DnB and Nordea have provided us with ratings for the same company we prefer DnB’s ratings 
over Nordea’s because they also have provided us with the historical data of the official credit ratings. 
If there are ratings from only one of the brokers they are included in the analysis to make the sample 
larger and more reliable. It is worth mentioning that there are no major differences between the ratings 
from DnB and Nordea. Including the discontinuous ratings from Carnegie and SEB as well, the 
sample size increases but as a whole it is natural to assume that the sample becomes less reliable and 
the results more controversial, since they are based on an underlying assumption that the 
discontinuous ratings from Carnegie and SEB are linear between the ratings. When including these 
ratings in the sample lead to a sample size of 45 of the companies with bond issues, more than 76 % 
of the possible companies. The ratings from Carnegie and SEB also provide the analysis with a 
broader understanding regarding different level of a company's credit risk, since they have issued 
lower rated companies relative to DnB and Nordea. Comparing the ratings from the four brokers, we 
have the following order of priority: DnB, Nordea, SEB and Carnegie. We prefer rating from SEB 
over them from Carnegie because the ratings from Carnegie seem to me the most controversial based 
on the information provided by the different brokerages themselves. This sample consists of 206 
observations.  
First time issuing sample 
In the period 2004-2010, 33 firms got rated for the first time as they entered into the bond market. To 
be able to investigate the change in debt ratios to the year before a debt issue we exclude the 
companies first-time-rated in 2004 and 2005, seven of the 33 firms, are omitted. Of the resulting 26 
firms, 22 companies have available fiscal years for our calculation.  
Issuing sample 
During the years 2004-2010 we initially have 76 bond issues. Due to the empirical design of the 
“POM” and “AC” tests we control the sample for issues in 2004. The sample is left with 71 
observations that are used when analyzing credit rating considerations impact on capital structure 
when making a new bond issue. 
                                                     
23
 Overview over bond issues, dated back to October 2003, was obtained from www.oslobors.no.  Based on the 
available historical bond issues we narrowed down the analysis period to 2004 until 2010.  
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Appendix C: Methodology 
The estimators presented in this appendix are the estimators of the panel data models. We have the 
OLS-estimator (pooled ordinary least squares model), within-estimator (fixed effect model) and the 
GLS-estimator (random effect model). For complete derivation see Brooks (2008).  
C.1. OLS-estimator 
The POLS estimators are consistent and unbiased if there is no presence of heteroscedasticity or serial 
correlation at the same time as there is no correlation between the residual and the explanatory 
variables. The POLS coefficient estimates for our vector of k parameters are calculated by the 
following equation: 
        (12) 
C.2.  Mean transformation approach – within estimator 
This method is based on transforming away all the companies’ fixed effects. The idea is to transform 
equation 5 in chapter 6.2 to eliminate ηi; by introducing the variables as the mean of the time-varying 
variables for each company i and subtracting this from (4)
 24
 we get: 
      (13) 
        (14) 
Now the companies’ fixed effects are canceled and the model is independent of ηi. Now we can 
estimate the betas in (15) with an OLS estimator, defined as the “Within- estimator” (βW): 
        (15) 
C.3. Generalized least squares procedure – GLS estimator 
The transformation involved in this procedure is to subtract a weighted mean, θ, of the yit over time. 
By weighted mean, we refer to a part of the mean rather than the whole mean, as was the case for the 
fixed-effect model. 
     (16) 
 
        (17) 
From (17) we can make the following observations; First, if θ =1 the model is equal to the fixed effect 
model, and the GLS-estimator will be equal to the within-estimator. Secondly, if θ = 0 the model is 
equal to the pooled OLS model and the GLS-estimator will be equal to the OLS-estimator. This 
indicates that if the GLS-estimator is equal to the within-estimator, the firm specific residual will be 
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. But if the GLS-estimator is relatively unequal to the 
within-estimator the random effect model will not provide efficient estimators and the fixed-effect 
model would be preferred.  
 
Θ will be the correction term and are calculated as a function of the variance of the observation error 
term, σu
2, and of the variance of the individual company disturbance term, ση
2
: 
                                                     
24
  and   mean equation: 
 . 
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        (18) 
The GLS-estimator is given by the following equation:  
       (19) 
This transformation of the model ensures that there is no cross-correlation in the error terms. The 
same procedure can be done in the case of time variations in our data. If that where the case, a time-
specific error term would be introduced as the individual company disturbance term. A two-way 
model could be the solution if we envisaged both cross-sectional and time varying random effects, 
allowing the intercepts to vary in both dimensions (Brooks, 2008).  
C.4. Hausman test 
The Hausman test is a way of determining the plausibility of the FE versus the RE model (Brooks, 
2000) and is based on detection possible correlation between omitted and explanatory variables.  
Formally the test shows to hypothesis based on assumption (b1) and (c1):  
 
        (20) 
        
 (x10) 
Based on these hypotheses, a true null hypothesis provides a random effect-estimator that is efficient 
and therefore preferable. This will provide a GLS-estimator that is approximately equal to the “Within 
Company”-estimator (θ = 1).However, if the alternative hypothesis is true, the fixed-effects method is 
preferred. This will provide a GLE-estimator relative different from the “Within Company”-estimator 
(θ = 0). Hence, when the null hypothesis is true, the GLS-estimator and the “Within Company”-
estimator do not differ systematically from each other. To test this: 
      (21) 
The test observer is chi-distributed and is given by the following: 
   (22) 
where k is the number of degrees of freedom and equal to the number of explanatory variables. If the 
test observer exceeds the critical value of the chi-distribution, we rejected the null hypothesis and use 
the fixed effects model. In practice is it quite common to reject the null hypothesis of the random 
effects model in favor of the fixed-effects model just because of the strict assumption about no 
correlation between the explanatory and omitted variables (c1).  
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Appendix D: Evaluation of Assumptions  
D.1. Test of Linearity  
The following figures presents scatterplots of explanatory variables and debt ratios. 
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Figure 8: Scatter plot of size and long term debt Figure 9: Scatter plot of tangibility and long term debt 
Figure 11: Scatterplot of profitability and long term debt Figure 10: Scatterplot of industry leverage and long term 
debt 
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Figure 12: Scatterplot of size and total debt Figure 13: Scatter plot of tangibility and total debt 
Figure 14: Scatter plot of profitability and total debt Figure 15: Scatter plot of industy leverage and total debt 
 X 
 
D.2. Test of Heteroscedasticity in Panel Data Models  
The following results are found by the Breuch-Pagan test. P-values below a 5% significance level, 
indicates a presence of heteroscedasticity.  
 
Table 21: Results of testing for heteroscedasticity 
 BP Degrees of freedom p-values 
Long term debt  74.667 10 5.524e-12 
Total debt  150.857 10 < 2.2e-16 
 
D.3. Test of Autocorrelation  
The following results are found by the Breusch-Godfrey/Wooldridge. P-values below a 5% 
significance level, indicates a presence of autocorrelation  
 
Table 22: Results of testing for autocorrelation 
 Chi^2 Degrees of freedom p-values 
Long term debt  11.518 1 0.00069 
Total debt  44.782 1 2.202e-11 
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Appendix E: Diagnostic Results  
 
The following results are found by a Lagrange Multiplier Test. P-values below a 5% significance 
level, indicates a presence of panel data effects  
 
Table 23: Results of testing for panel data effects 
 Chi^2 Degrees of freedom p-values 
Long term debt  1307.946 1 < 2.2e-16 
Total debt  1522.773 1 < 2.2e-16 
 
 
The following results are found by a Lagrange Multiplier Test. P-values below a 5% significance 
level, indicates correlated individual specific residual terms and explanatory variables. The 
recommended estimation model is then the fixed effects model, otherwise use the random effects 
model.    
 
Table 24: Results of testing for correlated individual error terms 
 Chi^2 Degrees of freedom p-values 
Long term debt  7.9636 4 0.09292 
Total debt  5.4844 4 0.2411 
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Appendix F: Results “NAC” test 
F.1. Results: Non-issuing firms 
Table 25: “NAC” test of non-issuing firms and effect on level of leverage 
Capital Structure Decisions – Non-issuing firms:  
Being near a change in rating  
(“NAC” test) 
 
Coefficients and p-values from random effects regressions. Regressions of the general model including proxies of credit 
rating measuring if the credit ratings are near a change. The regression is performed on the rated sample with level of 
long term debt and total debt as dependent variables. 
 
 
Panel A:  
Long term debt ratio 
LTDit     
Panel B:  
Total debt ratio  
TDit     
 
 
(9) 
 
(10) 
 
(9) 
 
(10) 
 
α 
 
0.3256*** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.3235*** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.0044 
(0.9668) 
 
0.0035 
(0.9737) 
 
POMt-1 
-0.0096 
(0.5710) 
 
 
 
 
-0.0013 
(0.9310) 
 
 
PLUSt-1 
 
 
0.0056 
(0.7822)  
 
0.0025 
(0.8903) 
MINUSt-1 
 
 
 
-0.0229 
(0.2443) 
 
 
 
 
-0.0046 
(0.7949) 
SIZEit 
 
-0.0115*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0115*** 
(0.0010) 
 
0.0063” 
(0.0504) 
 
0.0063” 
(0.0512) 
TANGit 
 
0.2125*** 
(0.0000) 
0.2203*** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.0337 
(0.3850) 
 
0.0356 
(0.3648) 
 
PROFit 
 
0.0618 
(0.3430) 
0.0544 
(0.4042) 
 
-0.2259*** 
(0.0002) 
 
-0.2287*** 
(0.0002) 
Ind_ltdit/ Ind_tdit 0.1672 
(0.3272) 
0.1730 
(0.3111) 
0.6083*** 
(0.0002) 
 
0.6106*** 
(0.0002) 
 
LTDi(t-1)/TDi(t-1) 
 
0.2199*** 
(0.0004) 
0.2118*** 
(0.0006) 
0.2779*** 
(0.0000) 
0.2756*** 
(0.0000) 
     
# Obs. 189 189 189 189 
# Years 1-6 1-6 1-6 1-6 
# Companies 45 45 45 45 
R-squared 0.2994 0.3028 0.41091 0.4114 
Adj. R-squared 0.2883 0.2900 0.39569 0.3939 
F-statistic 12.9483 11.2208 21.1335 18.0485 
(DF) (6 and 182) (7 and 181) (6 and 182) (7 and 181) 
p-value 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
     
P values are given in parantheses. *** indicates a significance level of 0.1 %, ** indicates a significance level of 1 %, * 
indicates a significance level of 5 % and ” Indicates a significance level of 10 %. 
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Table 26: “NAC” test of non-issuing firms and effect on adjustment of leverage 
Capital structure decisions – Non-issuing firms:  
Being near a change in rating  
(“NAC” test) 
 
Coefficients and p-values from random effects regressions. Regressions of the general model including proxies of credit 
rating measuring if the credit ratings are near a change. The regression is performed on the rated sample with 
adjustment of long term debt and total debt as dependent variables. 
 
 
Panel A:  
Long term debt ratio 
ΔLTDit     
Panel B:  
Total debt ratio  
ΔTDit     
 
 
(9) 
 
(10) 
 
(9) 
 
(10) 
 
α 
 
0.0601 
(0.4378) 
 
0.0570 
(0.4647) 
 
-0.1508 
(0.2102) 
 
-0.1629 
(0.1866) 
 
POMt-1 
-0.0602** 
(0.0058) 
 
 
 
 
-0.0039 
(0.8524) 
 
 
PLUSt-1 
 
 
-0.0527* 
(0.0454)  
 
0.0037 
(0.8838) 
MINUSt-1 
 
 
 
-0.0672** 
(0.0092) 
 
 
 
 
-0.0119 
(0.6350) 
SIZEit 
 
-0.0025 
(0.4592) 
-0.0024 
(0.4782) 
 
-0.0007 
(0.8212) 
 
-0.0005 
(0.8659) 
TANGit 
 
0.0333 
(0.4566) 
0.0352 
(0.4347) 
 
0.0546 
(0.1583) 
 
0.0561 
(0.1511) 
 
PROFit 
 
-0.0071 
(0.9293) 
-0.0111 
(0.8910) 
 
-0.1665* 
(0.0301) 
 
-0.1740* 
(0.0248) 
Ind_ltdit/ Ind_tdit 
 
0.0409 
(0.8264) 
0.0452 
(0.8093) 
 
0.2711 
(0.1425) 
 
0.2883 
(0.1268) 
     
# Observations 189 189 189 189 
# Years 1-6 1-6 1-6 1-6 
# Companies 45 45 45 45 
R-squared 0.049614 0.05108 0.04999 0.05239 
Adj. R-squared 0.048039 0.04919 0.04841 0.05045 
F-statistic 1.9097  1.63195 1.92627 1.67705 
(DF) (5 and 183) (6 and 182) (5 and 183) (6 and 182) 
p-value 0.09471 0.14059 0.09197 0.12889 
     
P values are given in parentheses. *** indicates a significance level of 0.1 %, ** indicates a significance level of 1 %, * 
indicates a significance level of 5 % and ” Indicates a significance level of 10 %. 
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F.2. Results: Issuing firms 
 
Table 27: “NAC” test of issuing firms and effect on level of leverage 
Capital structure decisions – Issuing firms: 
Being near a change in rating  
 (“NAC” tests) 
 
Coefficients and p-values from random effects regressions. Regressions of the general model including proxies of credit 
rating measuring if the credit ratings are near a change. The regression is performed on the issuing sample with level of 
long term debt and total debt as dependent variables. 
 
 
Panel A:  
Long term debt ratio 
LTDit     
Panel B:  
Total debt ratio  
TDit     
 
 
(9) 
 
(10) 
 
(9) 
 
(10) 
 
α 
 
0.4187*** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.4219*** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.4134* 
(0.0331) 
 
0.3990* 
(0.0433) 
 
POMt-1 
-0.0100 
(0.6613) 
 
 
 
 
-0.0230 
(0.3413) 
 
 
PLUSt-1 
 
 
0.0013 
(0.9665)  
 
-0.0129 
(0.6720) 
MINUSt-1 
 
 
 
-0.0192 
(0.4831) 
 
 
 
 
-0.0313 
(0.2887) 
SIZEit 
 
-0.0076” 
(0.0814) 
-0.0078” 
(0.0771) 
 
-0.0024 
(0.5242) 
 
-0.0022 
(0.5766) 
TANGit 
 
0.0899” 
(0.0927) 
0.0936” 
(0.0831) 
 
0.0065 
(0.8918) 
 
0.0071 
(0.8843) 
 
PROFit 
 
0.0863 
(0.5346) 
0.0847 
(0.5449) 
 
-0.2583* 
(0.0499) 
 
-0.2677* 
(0.0454) 
Ind_ltdit/ Ind_tdit -0.1620 
(0.4748) 
-0.1609 
(0.4790) 
0.0959 
(0.7325) 
 
0.1130 
(0.6917) 
 
LTDi(t-1)/TDi(t-1) 
 
0.3806*** 
(0.0000) 
0.3742*** 
(0.0000) 
0.3908*** 
(0.0000) 
0.3931*** 
(0.0000) 
     
# Obs. 71 71 71 71 
# Years 1-6 1-6 1-6 1-6 
# Companies 37 37 37 37 
R-squared 0.4134 0.4179 0.4412 0.4481 
Adj. R-squared 0.3726 0.3708 0.3977 0.3976 
F-statistic 7.5161 6.4608 8.3927 7.2741 
(DF) (6 and 64) (7 and 63) (6 and 64) (7 and 63) 
p-value 0.00000*** 0.00000*** 0.00000*** 0.00060*** 
     
P values are given in parentheses. *** indicates a significance level of 0.1 %, ** indicates a significance level of 1 %, * 
indicates a significance level of 5 % and ” Indicates a significance level of 10 %. 
 
  
 XV 
 
 
Table 28: “NAC” test of issuing firms and effect on adjustment of leverage 
Capital structure decisions – Issuing firms: 
Being near a change in rating  
 (“NAC” tests) 
 
Coefficients and p-values from random effects regressions. Regressions of the general model including proxies of credit 
rating measuring if the credit ratings are near a change. The regression is performed on the issuing sample with 
adjustment of long term debt and total debt as dependent variables. 
 
Panel A:  
Change in long term debt ratio 
ΔLTDit 
 
Panel B:  
Change in total debt ratio 
ΔTDit 
 
 
 
(9) 
 
(10) 
 
(9) 
 
(10) 
 
α 
 
0.3260** 
(0.0088) 
 
0.3260** 
(0.0093) 
 
0.1463 
(0.6089) 
 
0.1143 
(0.6895) 
 
POMt-1 
-0.0910** 
(0.0041) 
 
 
 
 
-0.0849* 
(0.0139) 
 
 
PLUSt-1 
 
 
-0.0975* 
(0.0180)  
 
-0.0626 
(0.1597) 
MINUSt-1 
 
 
 
-0.0851* 
(0.0288) 
 
 
 
 
-0.1044* 
(0.0135) 
SIZEit 
 
-0.0024 
(0.6810) 
-0.0024 
(0.6780) 
 
-0.0039 
(0.5117) 
 
-0.0033 
(0.5723) 
TANGit 
 
0.0449 
(0.5382) 
0.0437 
(0.5511) 
 
0.0778 
(0.2816) 
 
0.0785 
(0.2750) 
 
PROFit 
 
-0.1239 
(0.5069) 
-0.1207 
(0.5232) 
 
-0.4407* 
(0.0252) 
 
-0.4536* 
(0.0216) 
Ind_ltdit/ Ind_tdit 
 
-0.5536” 
(0.0658) 
-0.5520” 
(0.6892) 
 
0.0035 
(0.9935) 
 
0.0465 
(0.9132) 
     
# Observations 71 71 71 71 
# Years 1-6 1-6 1-6 1-6 
# Companies 37 37 37 37 
R-squared 0.23947 0.24046 0.20161 0.20968 
Adj. R-squared 0.21923 0.21676 0.18457 0.18901 
F-statistic 4.06162  3.35182  3.28056 2.82798 
(DF) (5 and 65) (6 and 64) (5 and 65) (6 and 64) 
p-value 0.00286** 0.00619** 0.01056* 0.01666* 
     
P values are given in parentheses. *** indicates a significance level of 0.1 %, ** indicates a significance level of 1 %, * 
indicates a significance level of 5 % and ” Indicates a significance level of 10 %. 
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Appendix G: Results “AC”-test  
G.1. Results: Non-issuing firms 
Table 29: “AC” test of non-issuing firms and effect on level of leverage 
Capital Structure Decisions – Non-issuing firms: 
After a Change in Rating  
(“AC” test) 
 
Coefficients and p-values from random effects regressions. Regressions of the general model including proxies of 
credit rating measuring if the credit ratings have either been upgraded or downgraded. The regression is performed 
on rated sample with level of long term debt and total debt as dependent variables. 
 
 
Panel A:  
Long term debt ratio 
LTDit  
 
Panel B:  
Total debt ratio 
TDit    
 
 
(11) 
 
(11) 
 
α 
 
0.3277*** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.0086 
(0.9355) 
 
DOWNt-1 
 
0.0068 
(0.7442) 
 
-0.0040 
(0.8308) 
UPt-1 
 
-0.0176 
(0.4511) 
 
-0.0132 
(0.5301) 
SIZEit -0.0116*** 
(0.0009) 
 
0.0062” 
(0.0530) 
 
TANGit 
0.2137*** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.0357 
(0.3625) 
 
PROFit 
0.0565 
(0.3874) 
 
-0.2290*** 
(0.0001) 
Ind_ltdit/ Ind_tdit 
 
0.1646 
(0.3393) 
0.6025*** 
(0.0002) 
 
LTDi(t-1)/TDi(t-1) 
0.2082*** 
(0.0006) 
 
0.2789*** 
(0.0000) 
   
# Observations 189 189 
# Years 1-6 1-6 
# Companies 45 45 
R-squared 0.29168 0.41217 
Adj. R-squared 0.27933 0.39473 
F-statistic 10.6315  18.1137 
(DF) (7 and 181) (7 and 181) 
p-value 0.00000 0.00000 
   
P values are given in parentheses. *** indicates a significance level of 0.1 %, ** indicates a significance level of 1 %, * 
indicates a significance level of 5 % and ” Indicates a significance level of 10 %. 
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Table 30: “AC” test of non-issuing firms and effect on adjustments of leverage 
Capital Structure Decisions – Non-issuing firms:  
After a Change in Rating  
(“AC” test) 
 
Coefficients and p-values from random effects regressions. Regressions of the general model including proxies of credit 
rating measuring if the credit ratings have either been upgraded or downgraded. The regression is performed on 
rated sample with adjustment of long term debt and total debt as dependent variables 
 
 
Panel A:  
Change in long term debt ratio 
ΔLTDit 
 
Panel B:  
Change in total debt ratio 
ΔTDit 
 
 
(11) 
 
(11) 
 
α 
 
0.0487 
(0.5302) 
 
-0.1423 
(0.2420) 
 
DOWNt-1 
 
0.0078 
(0.7856) 
 
-0.0200 
(0.4701) 
UPt-1 
 
-0.0578” 
(0.0741) 
 
-0.0376 
(0.2278) 
SIZEit -0.0034 
(0.3104) 
 
-0.0006 
(0.8371) 
 
TANGit 
0.0372 
(0.4093) 
 
0.0594 
(0.1301) 
 
PROFit 
-0.0259 
(0.7488) 
 
-0.1763* 
(0.0217) 
Ind_ltdit/ Ind_tdit 
 
0.0287 
(0.8782) 
0.2635 
(0.1571) 
   
# Observations 189 189 
# Years 1-6 1-6 
# Companies 45 45 
R-squared 0.02811 0.06009 
Adj. R-squared 0.02706 0.05786 
F-statistic 0.87594  1.9391 
(DF) (6 and 182) (6 and 182) 
p-value 0.5137 0.07676 
   
P values are given in parentheses. *** indicates a significance level of 0.1 %, ** indicates a significance level of 1 %, * 
indicates a significance level of 5 % and ” Indicates a significance level of 10 %. 
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G.2. Results: Issuing firms   
 
Table 31: “AC” test of issuing firms and effect on level of leverage 
Capital Structure Decisions – Issuing firms: 
After a Change in Rating  
(“AC” test) 
 
Coefficients and p-values from random effects regressions. Regressions of the general model including proxies of 
credit rating measuring if the credit ratings have been upgraded or downgraded. The regression is performed on 
the issuing sample with level of long term debt and total debt as dependent variables. 
 
 
Panel A:  
Long term debt ratio 
LTDit  
 
Panel B:  
Total debt ratio 
TDit    
 
 
(11) 
 
(11) 
 
α 
 
0.4233*** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.4613* 
(0.0226) 
 
DOWNt-1 
 
-0.0111 
(0.7263) 
 
-0.0209 
(0.5625) 
UPt-1 
 
-0.0092 
(0.7966) 
 
0.0221 
(0.5568) 
SIZEit -0.0079” 
(0.0719) 
 
-0.0028 
(0.4918) 
 
TANGit 
0.0970” 
(0.0745) 
 
0.0034 
(0.9472) 
 
PROFit 
0.0801 
(0.5775) 
 
-0.2606” 
(0.0581) 
Ind_ltdit/ Ind_tdit 
 
-0.1688 
(0.4623) 
0.0371 
(0.8997) 
 
LTDi(t-1)/TDi(t-1) 
0.3710*** 
(0.0000) 
 
0.3597*** 
(0.0000) 
   
# Observations 71 71 
# Years 1-6 1-6 
# Companies 37 37 
R-squared 0.41373 0.48279 
Adj. R-squared 0.36711 0.42839 
F-statistic 6.35093  8.36613 
(DF) (7 and 63) (7 and 63) 
p-value 0.00001*** 0.00000*** 
   
P values are given in parentheses. *** indicates a significance level of 0.1 %, ** indicates a significance level of 1 
%, * indicates a significance level of 5 % and ” Indicates a significance level of 10 %. 
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Table 32: “AC” test of issuing firms and effect on adjustments of leverage 
Capital Structure Decisions – Issuing firms: 
After a Change in Rating  
(“AC” test) 
 
Coefficients and p-values from random effects regressions. Regressions of the general model including proxies of 
credit rating measuring if the credit ratings have been upgraded or downgraded. The regression is performed on the 
issuing sample with adjustment of long term debt and total debt as dependent variables. 
 
 
Panel A:  
Change in long term debt ratio 
ΔLTDit 
 
Panel B:  
Change in total debt ratio 
ΔTDit 
 
 
(11) 
 
(11) 
 
α 
 
0.3693** 
(0.0049) 
 
0.2417 
(0.4124) 
 
DOWNt-1 
 
-0.0302 
(0.5366) 
 
-0.0894” 
(0.0949) 
UPt-1 
 
-0.0731 
(0.1664) 
 
-0.0651 
(0.2344) 
SIZEit -0.0040 
(0.5016) 
 
-0.0059 
(0.3242) 
 
TANGit 
0.0811 
(0.2919) 
 
0.1116 
(0.1355) 
 
PROFit 
-0.1915 
(0.3370) 
 
-0.5032* 
(0.0134) 
Ind_ltdit/ Ind_tdit 
 
-0.7368* 
(0.0182) 
-0.1634 
(0.7096) 
   
# Observations 71 71 
# Years 1-6 1-6 
# Companies 37 37 
R-squared 0.16058 0.17041 
Adj. R-squared 0.14475 0.15361 
F-statistic 2.00718  2.18907 
(DF) (6 and 64) (6 and 64) 
p-value 0.07756” 0.05539” 
   
P values are given in parentheses. *** indicates a significance level of 0.1 %, ** indicates a significance level of 1 %, * 
indicates a significance level of 5 % and ” Indicates a significance level of 10 %. 
 
 
 
